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In this document, we describe the design of a new family of block ciphers, named
FOX. The main goals of this design, besides a very high security level, are a large
implementation flexibility on various platforms as well as high performances. The
high-level structure is based on a Lai-Massey scheme, while the round functions are
substitution-permutation networks. In addition, we propose a new design of strong
and efficient key-schedule algorithms. FOX is the result of a joint project with the
company MediaCrypt AG in Zu¨rich, Switerland (http://www.mediacrypt.com);
the design has furthermore benefited from expert reviews of Prof. Jacques Stern,
E´cole Normale Supe´rieure, Paris (France) and of Prof. David Wagner, University
of California, Berkeley (USA). FOX may be subject to patenting and licensing is-
sues: please contact MediaCrypt (email info@mediacrypt.com) for more informa-
tion about them. This document1 is organized as follows: in §1, the conventions and
mathematical notations used throughout this document are described. §2 describes
formally the cipher family, while §3 gives the mathematical foundations and ratio-
nales behind FOX. §4 discusses several issues related to the implementation of FOX.
Finally, a reference implementation written in C is given; its sole goal is to help to
understand how FOX is defined and to furnish test vectors.
1This document is the extended version of [JV04a]; it superseeds EPFL technical reports IC/2003/82 and
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Name Block size (in bits) Key size (in bits) Rounds number
FOX64 64 128 16
FOX128 128 256 16
FOX64/k/r 64 k r
FOX128/k/r 128 k r
Figure 1: Members of the FOX family
1 Notations
The purpose of this section is to define the mathematical notations, conventions and symbols
used throughout this document.
1.1 The FOX Family
The family consists in two main block cipher designs, the first one having a 64-bit blocksize
and the other one a 128-bit blocksize. Each design allows a variable number of rounds and a
variable key size up to 256 bits. The different members of the FOX family are listed in Fig. 1.
The following conditions must hold in the case of FOX64/k/r and FOX128/k/r: the number of
rounds r must satisfy 12 ≤ r ≤ 255, while the key length k must satisfy 0 ≤ k ≤ 256, with k
multiple of 8.
1.2 Hexadecimal Notation
The hexadecimal notation will be intensively used in this document to write binary strings in
a compact way. Numbers written in hexadecimal notations begins with the prefix 0x. For
instance, 0x01234567 is a 32-bit value. The following table gives the correspondance between
decimal digits, hexadecimal digits and binary values.
Decimal 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Binary 0000 0001 0010 0011 0100 0101 0110 0111
Hexadecimal 0x0 0x1 0x2 0x3 0x4 0x5 0x6 0x7
Decimal 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Binary 1000 1001 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111
Hexadecimal 0x8 0x9 0xA 0xB 0xC 0xD 0xE 0xF
1.3 Mathematical Operations
Fig. 2 is a list of the mathematical operations used throughout this document together with




representation is defined in §1.6.
1.4 Prefixes, Indices and Suffixes
Here are some generic conventions used in the notation:
- A variable x written with the suffix (n) (i.e. x(n)) indicates that x has a length of n bits.
For instance, y(1) is a single-bit variable and F(64) is a 64-bit value. The suffix will be
omitted if the context is clear.
- A variable x written with the suffix [a...n] (i.e. x[a...b]) indicates the bit subset of the variable




bac “Floor” function b12.34c = 12
dae “Ceil” function d12.34e = 13
a⊕ b Bitwise exclusive-OR 0xABCD⊕ 0x1234 = 0xB9F9
a ∧ b Bitwise AND 0xABCD∧ 0x1234 = 0x0204
a ∨ b Bitwise OR 0xABCD∨ 0x1234 = 0xBBFD
a n Logical left shift of n positions 0x03 1 = 0x06
a n Logical right shift of n positions 0x03 1 = 0x01
a Logical negation 0xA = 0x5
a||b Concatenation 0xABCD||0x1234 = 0xABCD1234
a⊕ b Addition in GF(28) 0x02⊕ 0x06 = 0x04
a · b Multiplication in GF(28) 0x02 · 0x60 = 0xC0
Figure 2: Mathematical Operations
- Indexed variables are denoted as follows: xi is a variable x indexed by i. A variable x
indexed by i with a length of ` bits is denoted xi(`). A C-like notation is used for indexing
which means that indices begin with 0.
- The suffix l is used to denote the left half of a variable. For instance, x l is the left half of
the variable x.
- The suffix r is used to denote the right half of a variable. For instance, xr is the right half
of the variable x.
- The suffixes ll, lr, rl, rr are used to denote quarters of a variable. For instance, x =
xll||xlr||xrl||xrr.
- In general, the input of a function f is denoted x and its output y.
1.5 Byte Ordering
In this document, a big-endian ordering is assumed. The index of the most significant part in a
variable is equal to 0, while the index corresponding to the least significant part is the largest
one. Here is an example: a 128-bit value q(128) can be written as
q(128) = r0(64)||r1(64)
= s0(32)||s1(32)||s2(32)||s3(32)
= t0(8)||t1(8)|| . . . ||t14(8)||t15(8)
= u0(1)||u1(1)|| . . . ||u126(1)||u127(1)
1.6 Finite Field GF(28)
Some of the mathematical operations used in FOX are the addition and the multiplication in the









used in the FOX definition. Let be the following irreducible polynomial P (α) over
GF (2) = {0, 1}:
P (α) = α8 + α7 + α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + 1 (1)
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Elements of the field are polynomials in α of degree at most 7 with coefficients in GF (2). Let
s be an 8-bit binary string
s = s0(1)||s1(1)||s2(1)||s3(1)||s4(1)||s5(1)||s6(1)||s7(1)







2 + s6(1)α + s7(1)








, denoted ⊕, is the usual addition of polynomials where the respective
coefficients are added modulo 2. For instance,
(α7 + α6 + α3 + α2 + 1)⊕ (α6 + α5 + α + 1) = α7 + α5 + α3 + α2 + α




is equivalent to a bitwise exclusive-OR
operation of their representation as an 8-bit binary string.








, denoted “·”, is the usual multiplication of polynomials where the
result is taken modulo the polynomial defined in Eq. (1) and coefficients are reduced modulo
2. The reduction modulo P (α) can be computed by taking the rest of the Euclidean division of
the product by P (α). For instance,
(α5 + α4 + α3) · (α3 + α + 1) = α8 + α7 + α3
≡ α6 + α5 + α4 + 1 (mod P (α))
2 Description
In this part of the document, we describe precisely both versions of FOX, i.e. the one having a
64-bit block size (FOX64/k/r) and the one with a block size of 128 bits (FOX128/k/r).
This chapter is organized as follows: in §2.1.1, the high-level structure of FOX64/k/r, which
is a Lai-Massey scheme, is formally described, together with the encryption and decryption
operations. In §2.1.2, the same is done for FOX128/k/r, which is built on an Extended Lai-
Massey scheme. In §2.2, the internal functions f32 and f64 used in both algorithms are formally
defined, together with their building blocks. Finally, in §2.3, the key-schedule algorithm is
described.
2.1 High-Level Structure
In this part, we describe the skeleton and the encryption/decryption processes for FOX64 and
FOX128. For this purpose, we will follow a top-down approach.
2.1.1 FOX64/k/r Skeleton
The 64-bit version of FOX is the (r − 1)-times iteration of a round function denoted lmor64,
followed by the application of a slightly modified version of lmor64, named lmid64. lmio64 is a
function used during the decryption operation. Formally, lmor64, lmio64 and lmid64 take all a
64-bit input x(64), a 64-bit round key rk(64) and return a 64-bit output y(64):
lmor64, lmio64, lmid64 :
{
{0, 1}64 × {0, 1}64 → {0, 1}64
(x(64), rk(64)) 7→ y(64)
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FOX64 Encryption The encryption c(64) by FOX64/k/r of a 64-bit plaintext p(64) is defined
as
c(64) = lmid64(lmor64(. . . (lmor64(p(64), rk0(64)), . . . , rkr−2(64)), rkr−1(64))
where
rk(r·64) = rk0(64)||rk1(64)|| . . . ||rkr−1(64)
is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key k(`).
FOX64 Decryption The decryption p(64) by FOX64/k/r of a 64-bit ciphertext c(64) is defined
as
p(64) = lmid64(lmio64(. . . (lmio64(c(64), rkr−1(64)), . . . , rk1(64)), rk0(64))
where
rk(r·64) = rk0(64)||rk1(64)|| . . . ||rkr−1(64)
is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key k(`), as for the
encryption.
2.1.2 FOX128/k/r Skeleton
Similarly to the definition of FOX64, the 128-bit version of FOX is the (r − 1)-times iteration
of a round function denoted elmor128, followed by the application of a modified version of
elmor128 named elmid128. elmio128 is a function used during the decryption operation. For-
mally, elmor128, elmio128 and elmid128 all take a 128-bit input x(128), a 128-bit round key rk(128)
and return a 128-bit output y(128):
elmor128, elmio128, elmid128 :
{
{0, 1}128 × {0, 1}128 → {0, 1}128
(x(128), rk(128)) 7→ y(128)
FOX128 Encryption The encryption c(128) by FOX128/k/r of a 128-bit plaintext p(128) is
defined as
c(128) =
elmid128(elmor128(. . . elmor128(p(128), rk0(128)), . . . , rkr−2(128)), rkr−1(128))
where
rk(r·128) = rk0(128)||rk1(128)|| . . . ||rkr−1(128)
is the subkey stream produced by the key schedule algorithm from the key k(`).
FOX128 Decryption The decryption p(128) by FOX128/k/r of a 128-bit ciphertext c(128) is
defined as
p(128) =
elmid128(elmio128(. . . elmio128(C(128), rkr−1(128)), . . . , rk1(128)), rk0(128))
where
rk(r·128) = rk0(128)||rk1(128)|| . . . ||rkr−1(128)








Figure 3: lmor64 Round Function
2.2 Internal Functions
In this part, we describe formally all the functions used internally in the core of both algorithms
FOX64/k/r and FOX128/k/r.
2.2.1 Definitions of lmor64, lmid64, lmio64
In the 64-bit version of the algorithm, one uses three slightly different round functions. The first
one, lmor64, illustrated in Fig. 3, is built as a Lai-Massey scheme combined with an orthomor-
phism2 or. This function transforms a 64-bit input x(64) split in two parts x(64) = xl(32)||xr(32)
and a 64-bit round key rk(64) in a 64-bit output y(64) = yl(32)||yr(32) as follows:












xl(32) ⊕ xr(32), rk(64)
))
The lmid64 function is a slightly modified version of lmor64, namely it is the same one without
the orthomorphism or:












xl(32) ⊕ xr(32), rk(64)
))






yll(32) ylr(32) yrl(32) yrr(32)
rk(128)
Figure 4: Round function elmor128
Finally, lmio64 is defined by












xl(32) ⊕ xr(32), rk(64)
))
where io is the inverse of the orthormorphism or.
2.2.2 Definitions of elmor128, elmid128, elmio128
In the 128-bit version of the algorithm, one uses three slightly different round functions, as
in the 64-bit version. The first one, elmor128, illustrated in Fig. 4, is built as an Extended
Lai-Massey scheme combined with two orthomorphisms or. This function transforms a 128-
bit input x(128) split in four parts x(128) = xll(32)||xlr(32)||xrl(32)||xrr(32) and a 128-bit round key
rk(128) in a 128-bit output y(128) = yll(32)||ylr(32)||yrl(32)||yrr(32) as follows:

































The elmid128 function is a slightly modified version of elmor128, namely it is the same one
without the orthomorphism or:































Finally, elmio128 is defined by
































2.2.3 Definitions of or and io
The orthomorphism or is a function taking a 32-bit input x(32) = xl(16)||xr(16) and returning a









or is in fact a one-round Feistel scheme with the identity function as round function. The inverse










2.2.4 Definition of f32
The function f32 builds the core of FOX64/k/r. It is built of three main parts: a substitution
part, denoted sigma4, a diffusion part, denoted mu4, and a round key addition part (see Fig. 5).
Formally, the f32 function takes a 32-bit input x(32), a 64-bit round key rk(64) = rk0(32)||rk1(32)





= sigma4(mu4(sigma4(x(32) ⊕ rk0(32)))⊕ rk1(32))⊕ rk0(32)
2.2.5 Definition of f64
The function f64 builds the core of FOX128/k/r. It is built of three main parts: a substitution
part, denoted sigma8, a diffusion part, denoted mu8, and a round key addition part (see Fig. 6).
Formally, the f64 function takes a 64-bit input x(64), a 128-bit round key rk(128) = rk0(64)||rk1(64)





= sigma8(mu8(sigma8(x(64) ⊕ rk0(64)))⊕ rk1(64))⊕ rk0(64)
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Figure 5: Function f32
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sbox sbox sbox sbox
sbox sbox sbox sbox
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Figure 6: Function f64
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.0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 .A .B .C .D .E .F
0. 5D DE 00 B7 D3 CA 3C 0D C3 F8 CB 8D 76 89 AA 12
1. 88 22 4F DB 6D 47 E4 4C 78 9A 49 93 C4 C0 86 13
2. A9 20 53 1C 4E CF 35 39 B4 A1 54 64 03 C7 85 5C
3. 5B CD D8 72 96 42 B8 E1 A2 60 EF BD 02 AF 8C 73
4. 7C 7F 5E F9 65 E6 EB AD 5A A5 79 8E 15 30 EC A4
5. C2 3E E0 74 51 FB 2D 6E 94 4D 55 34 AE 52 7E 9D
6. 4A F7 80 F0 D0 90 A7 E8 9F 50 D5 D1 98 CC A0 17
7. F4 B6 C1 28 5F 26 01 AB 25 38 82 7D 48 FC 1B CE
8. 3F 6B E2 67 66 43 59 19 84 3D F5 2F C9 BC D9 95
9. 29 41 DA 1A B0 E9 69 D2 7B D7 11 9B 33 8A 23 09
A. D4 71 44 68 6F F2 0E DF 87 DC 83 18 6A EE 99 81
B. 62 36 2E 7A FE 45 9C 75 91 0C 0F E7 F6 14 63 1D
C. 0B 8B B3 F3 B2 3B 08 4B 10 A6 32 B9 A8 92 F1 56
D. DD 21 BF 04 BE D6 FD 77 EA 3A C8 8F 57 1E FA 2B
E. 58 C5 27 AC E3 ED 97 BB 46 05 40 31 E5 37 2C 9E
F. 0A B1 B5 06 6C 1F A3 2A 70 FF BA 07 24 16 C6 61
Figure 7: Mapping sbox
2.2.6 Definition of sigma4, sigma8 and sbox
The function sigma4 takes a 32-bit input x(32) = x0(8)||x1(8)||x2(8)||x3(8) and returns a 32-bit






The function sigma8 takes a 64-bit input
x(64) = x0(8)||x1(8)||x2(8)||x3(8)||x4(8)||x5(8)||x6(8)||x7(8)







Finally, the sbox function is the lookup-up table defined in Fig. 7. We read this table as follows:
to compute sbox(4C), one selects first the row named 4. (i.e. the fifth row), and then one selects
the column named .C (i.e. the thirteenth column) and we get finally
sbox(4C) = 15
2.2.7 Definition of mu4
The diffusive part of f32 is a linear (4, 4)-multipermutation defined on GF(28). Formally, it is
a function taking a 32-bit input
x(32) = x0(8)||x1(8)||x2(8)||x3(8)
and returning a 32-bit output
y(32) = y0(8)||y1(8)||y2(8)||y3(8)
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1 1 1 α
1 c α 1
c α 1 1












c = α−1 + 1 = α7 + α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2 + 1
All the additions and multiplications are defined in GF(28) using the representation described
in §1.6.
2.2.8 Definition of mu8
The diffusive part of f64 is a linear (8, 8)-multipermutation defined on GF(28). Formally, it is
a function taking a 64-bit input
x(64) = x0(8)||x1(8)||x2(8)||x3(8)||x4(8)||x5(8)||x6(8)||x7(8)
and returning a 64-bit output
y(64) = y0(8)||y1(8)||y2(8)||y3(8)||y4(8)||y5(8)||y6(8)||y7(8)















1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a
1 a b c d e f 1
a b c d e f 1 1
b c d e f 1 a 1
c d e f 1 a b 1
d e f 1 a b c 1
e f 1 a b c d 1

















a = α + 1
b = α−1 + α−2 = α7 + α
c = α
d = α2
e = α−1 = α7 + α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2
f = α−2 = α6 + α5 + α4 + α3 + α2 + α
All the additions and multiplications are defined in GF(28) using the representation described
in §1.6.
2.3 Key-Schedule Algorithms
The key schedule is the algorithm which derives the subkey material
rk(r·64) = rk0(64)||rk1(64)|| . . . ||rkr−1(64)
and
rk(r·128) = rk0(128)||rk1(128)|| . . . ||rkr−1(128)
(for FOX64 and FOX128, respectively) from the key k(`).
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Design Block size Key size Key-Schedule Version ek
FOX64 64 0 ≤ ` ≤ 128 KS64 128
FOX64 64 136 ≤ ` ≤ 256 KS64h 256
FOX128 128 0 ≤ ` ≤ 256 KS128 256








Figure 9: Key-Schedule Algorithm (High-Level Overview)
2.3.1 General Overview
A FOX key k(`) must have a bit-length ` such that 0 ≤ ` ≤ 256, and ` must be a multiple of
8. Depending on the key length and the block size, a member of the FOX block cipher family
may use one among three different key-schedule algorithm versions, denoted respectively KS64,
KS64h and KS128. A constant, ek, depends on these values as well. The table in Fig. 8 defines
precisely the relation between the key size, the block size, the constant ek and the key-schedule
algorithm version.
The three different versions of the key-schedule algorithm are constituted of four main
parts: a padding part, denoted P, expanding k(`) into ek bits, a mixing part, denoted M, a
diversification part, denoted D, whose core consists mainly in a linear feedback shift register
denoted LFSR, and finally, a non-linear part, denoted NLx (see Fig. 9 and Alg. 1 for a high-level
overview of the key-schedule algorithm design). As outlined above, the key-schedule algorithm
definition depends on a the number of rounds r, on the key length ` and on the cipher (FOX64
or FOX128). In fact, NLx is the only part which differs between the different versions, and we
will denote the three variants NL64, NL64h and NL128.
2.3.2 Definition of KS64
This key-schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX64 with keys smaller or equal to 128
bits. It takes the following parameters as input: a key k of length ` bits, with 0 ≤ ` ≤ 128 and
a number of rounds r. It returns in output r 64-bit subkeys. KS64 is formally defined in Alg. 2.
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/* Initialization of the loop */
i← 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
dkey ← D(mkey, i, r)
Output rki−1(x) ← NLx(dkey)
i← i + 1
end while
Algorithm 2 Key-Schedule Algorithm KS64
/* Preprocessing */







/* Initialization of the loop */
i = 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
dkey = D(mkey, i, r)
Output rki−1(64) = NL64(dkey)
i = i + 1
end while
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2.3.3 Definition of KS64h
This key schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX64 with keys larger than 128 bits.
It takes the following parameters as input: a key k of length ` bits, with 136 ≤ ` ≤ 256 and a
number of rounds r. It returns in output r 64-bit subkeys. KS64h is formally defined in Alg. 3.
Algorithm 3 Key-Schedule Algorithm KS64h
/* Preprocessing */







/* Initialization of the loop */
i = 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
dkey = D(mkey, i, r)
Output rki−1(64) = NL64h(dkey)
i = i + 1
end while
2.3.4 Definition of KS128
This key schedule algorithm is designed to be used by FOX128. It takes the following parameters
as input: a key k of length ` bits, with 0 ≤ ` ≤ 256 and a number of rounds r. It returns in
output r 128-bit subkeys. KS128 is formally defined in Alg. 4.
Algorithm 4 Key-Schedule Algorithm KS128
/* Preprocessing */







/* Initialization of the loop */
i = 1
/* Loop */
while i ≤ r do
dkey = D(mkey, i, r)
Output rki−1(128) = NL128(dkey)
i = i + 1
end while
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2.3.5 Definition of P
The P-part, taking ek and ` as input, is basically a function expanding a bit string by ek−`8
bytes. More precisely, then P concatenates the input key k with the first ek − ` bits of the
constant pad, giving pkey as output. The P function is defined formally in Alg. 5. The pad
Algorithm 5 P-Part
Output pkey = k||pad[0...ek−`−1]
constant value is defined in the following section.
2.3.6 Definition of pad







Thus, it is the concatenation of the four following 64-bit constants




2.3.7 Definition of M
The M-part is used to mix the padded key pkey, such that the constant words are mixed uo
by using the randomness provided by the key. This is done with help of a Fibonacci recursion.
It takes as input a key pkey with length ek (expressed in bits). More formally, the padded key
pkey is seen as an array of ek8 bytes pkeyi(8), 0 ≤ i ≤
ek
8 − 1, and is mixed according to
mkeyi(8) = pkeyi(8) ⊕
(
mkeyi−1(8) + mkeyi−2(8) mod 2
8
)




with the convention that
mkey−2(8) = 0x6A and mkey−1(8) = 0x76





, which is actually a XOR operation.
2.3.8 Definition of D
The D-part is a diversification part. It takes a key mkey having a length in bits equal to ek,
the total round number r, and the current round number i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ r; it modifies mkey
with help of the output of a 24-bit Linear Shift Feedback Register (LFSR) denoted LFSR. More











concatenated with one residue byte mkeyrb(8) (if ek = 128) or two residue bytes mkeyrb(16) (if
ek = 256), and is modified according to















− 1; the dkeyrb(8) value (dkeyrb(16)) is obtained by XORing the most 8 (16)










, r) with mkeyrb(8) (mkeyrb(16)), respectively. The
remaining 16 (8) bits of the LFSR routine output are discarded.
2.3.9 Definition of LFSR
The diversification part D needs a stream of pseudo-random values; it is produced by a 24-bit
linear feedback shift register, denoted LFSR. This algorithm takes two inputs, the total number
of rounds r and a number of preliminary clocking c. It is based on the following primitive
polynomial of degree 24 over GF(2).





the FOX block cipher family is the irreducible polynomial over GF (2) defined by
PKS(ξ) = ξ24 + ξ4 + ξ3 + ξ + 1
The register is initially seeded with the value 0x6A||r(8)||r(8), where r(8) is expressed as an 8-bit
value, and r(8) is its bitwise complemented version (i.e. r(8) = r(8) ⊕ 0xFF). LSFR is described
formally in Alg. 6.





while p < c do
p = p + 1
if (reg AND 0x800000) 6= 0x000000 then
reg = (reg  1)⊕ 0x00001B
else




2.3.10 Definition of NL64
The NL64-part takes a single input: the 128-bit value dkey corresponding to the current round.
The dkey value passes through a substitution layer (made of four parallel sigma4 functions), a
diffusion layer (made of four parallel mu4 functions) and a mixing layer called mix64. Then,
the constant pad[0...127] is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if k = ek. The result
passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 64 bits and the resulting value
is encrypted first with a lmor64 round function, where the subkey is the left half of the dkey
value and second by a lmid64 function, where the subkey is the right half of dkey. The resulting
value is defined to be the 64-bit round key. Fig. 10 illustrates the NL64 process and Alg. 7
describes it formally.
2.3.11 Definition of NL64h
The NL64h-part takes a single input: the 256-bit value dkey corresponding to the current round.
The dkey value passes through a substitution layer (made of eight parallel sigma4 functions), a
18
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Figure 10: NL64 Part
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t0(32) ||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)=mix64(t0(32) ||t1(32) ||t2(32)||t3(32))
t0(32) ||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)=(t0(32) ||t1(32) ||t2(32)||t3(32))⊕pad[0..127]







Output t0(32) ||t1(32) as round subkey.
diffusion layer (made of eight parallel mu4 functions) and a mixing layer called mix64h. Then,
the constant pad is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if k = ek. The result passes
through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 64 bits and the resulting value is
encrypted first with three lmor64 round functions, where the respective subkeys are the three
left quarters of the dkey value and secondly by a lmid64 function, where the subkey is the
rightmost quarter of dkey. The resulting value is defined to be the 64-bit round key. Fig. 11
illustrates the NL64h process and Alg. 8 describes it formally.
2.3.12 Definition of NL128
The NL128-part takes a single different input: the 256-bit value dkey corresponding to the
current round. Basically, the dkey value passes through a substitution layer (made of four
parallel sigma8 functions), a diffusion layer (made of four parallel mu8 functions) and a mixing
layer called mix128. Then, the constant pad is XORed and the result is flipped if and only if
k = ek. The result passes through a second substitution layer, it is hashed down to 128 bits
and the resulting value is encrypted first with a elmor128 round function, where the subkey is
the left half of the dkey value and second by a elmid128 function, where the subkey is the right
half of dkey. The resulting value is defined to be the 128-bit round key. Fig. 12 illustrates the
NL128 process and Alg. 9 describes it formally.
2.3.13 Definition of mix64
Given an input vector of four 32-bit values, denoted
x = x0(32)||x1(32)||x2(32)||x3(32)
the mix64 function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output
vector denoted y = y0(32)||y1(32)||y2(32)||y3(32). More formally, mix64 is defined as
y0(32) = x1(32) ⊕ x2(32) ⊕ x3(32)
y1(32) = x0(32) ⊕ x2(32) ⊕ x3(32)
y2(32) = x0(32) ⊕ x1(32) ⊕ x3(32)
y3(32) = x0(32) ⊕ x1(32) ⊕ x2(32)
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Figure 11: NL64h Part
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Algorithm 8 NL64h Part
/* Initialization */
t0(32) ||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)||t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32) ||t7(32)=dkey
/* Substitution Layer */
t0(32) ||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)=sigma4(t0(32))||sigma4(t1(32))||sigma4(t2(32))||sigma4(t3(32))
t4(32) ||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32)=sigma4(t4(32))||sigma4(t5(32))||sigma4(t6(32))||sigma4(t7(32))







if k = ek then
t0(32) ||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)||t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32) ||t7(32)=t0(32)||t1(32) ||t2(32)||t3(32)||t4(32)||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32)
end if
/* Substitution Layer */
t0(32) ||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)=sigma4(t0(32))||sigma4(t1(32))||sigma4(t2(32))||sigma4(t3(32))
t4(32) ||t5(32)||t6(32)||t7(32)=sigma4(t4(32))||sigma4(t5(32))||sigma4(t6(32))||sigma4(t7(32))
/* Hashing Layer */
t0(32) ||t1(32)||t2(32)||t3(32)=(t0(32)⊕t1(32))||(t2(32)⊕t3(32))||(t4(32)⊕t5(32))||(t6(32)⊕t7(32))
t0(32) ||t1(32)=(t0(32)⊕t2(32))||(t1(32)⊕t3(32))





Output t0(32)||t1(32) as round subkey.





t0(64) ||t1(64)||t2(64)||t3(64)=(t0(64) ||t1(64) ||t2(64)||t3(64))⊕pad







Output t0(64)||t1(64) as round subkey.
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Figure 12: NL128 Part
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2.3.14 Definition of mix64h
Given an input vector of eight 32-bit values, denoted
x = x0(32)||x1(32)||x2(32)||x3(32)||x4(32)||x5(32)||x6(32)||x7(32)
the mix64h function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output
vector denoted
y = y0(32)||y1(32)||y2(32)||y3(32)||y4(32)||y5(32)||y6(32)||y7(32)
More formally, mix64h is defined as
y0(32) = x2(32) ⊕ x4(32) ⊕ x6(32)
y1(32) = x3(32) ⊕ x5(32) ⊕ x7(32)
y2(32) = x0(32) ⊕ x4(32) ⊕ x6(32)
y3(32) = x1(32) ⊕ x5(32) ⊕ x7(32)
y4(32) = x0(32) ⊕ x2(32) ⊕ x6(32)
y5(32) = x1(32) ⊕ x3(32) ⊕ x7(32)
y6(32) = x0(32) ⊕ x2(32) ⊕ x4(32)
y7(32) = x1(32) ⊕ x3(32) ⊕ x5(32)
2.3.15 Definition of mix128
Given an input vector of four 64-bit values, denoted x = x0(64)||x1(64)||x2(64)||x3(64), the mix64
function consists in processing it by the following relations, resulting in an output vector denoted
y = y0(64)||y1(64)||y2(64)||y3(64). More formally, mix128 is defined as
y0(64) = x1(64) ⊕ x2(64) ⊕ x3(64)
y1(64) = x0(64) ⊕ x2(64) ⊕ x3(64)
y2(64) = x0(64) ⊕ x1(64) ⊕ x3(64)
y3(64) = x0(64) ⊕ x1(64) ⊕ x2(64)
3 Rationales
In this part, we describe several rationales about important components building the FOX family
of block ciphers.
3.1 Non-Linear Mapping sbox
As outlined earlier, our primary goal was to avoid a purely algebraic construction for the S-
box; a secondary goal was the possibility to implement it in a very efficient way on hardware
using ASIC or FPGA technologies. The sbox function is a non-linear bijective mapping on 8-bit
values. It consists of a Lai-Massey scheme with 3 rounds taking three different substitution
boxes as round function where the orthormorphism of the third round is omitted; these “small”
S-boxes are denoted S1, S2 and S3, and their content is given in Fig. 13. The orthomorphism
or4 used in the Lai-Massey scheme is a single round of a 4-bit Feistel scheme with the identity
function as round function. We describe now the generation process of the sbox transformation.
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x 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F
S1(x) 2 5 1 9 E A C 8 6 4 7 F D B 0 3
S2(x) B 4 1 F 0 3 E D A 8 7 5 C 2 9 6
S3(x) D A B 1 4 3 8 9 5 7 2 C F 0 6 E
Figure 13: The three small S-boxes of FOX.
First a set of three different candidates for small substitution boxes, each having a LPmax and
a DPmax smaller than 2










with • denoting the scalar product over GF (2)-vectors, and
DPf(a, b) = Pr
X




Then, the candidate sbox mapping was evaluated and tested regarding its LPmax and DPmax




its algebraic degree is equal to 6.
3.2 Linear Multipermutations mu4/mu8
Both mu4 and mu8 are linear multipermutations. This kind of construction was early recognized
as being optimal for which regards its diffusion properties (see [SV95, Vau95]). As explained in
[JV04b], not all constructions are very efficient to implement, especially on low-end smartcard,
which have usually very few available memory and computational power. We have thus chosen a
circulating-like construction. Furthermore, in order to be efficiently implementable, the elements
of the matrix, which are elements of GF(28), should be efficient to multiply to. The only really
efficient operations are the addition, the multiplication by α and the division by α. Note that
α7+α = α−1+α−2, α7+α6+α5+α4+α3+α2 = α−1, and that α6+α5+α4+α3+α2+α = α−2.
3.3 Key-Schedule Algorithms
The FOX key-schedule algorithms were designed with several rationales in mind: first, the
function, which takes a key k and the round number r and returns r subkeys should be a
cryptographic pseudorandom, collision resistant and one-way function. Second, the sequence of
subkeys should be generated in any direction without any complexity penalty. Third, all the
bytes of mkey should be randomized even when the key size is strictly smaller than ek. Finally,
the key-schedule algorithm should resist related-cipher attacks as described by Wu in [Wu02],
since FOX can possibly use different number of rounds.
We are convinced that “strong” key-schedule algorithms have significant advantages in terms
of security, even if the price to pay is a smaller key agility, as discussed earlier. In the case of
FOX, we believe that the time needed to compute the subkeys, which is about equal to the time
needed to encrypt 6 blocks of data (in the case of FOX64 with keys strictly larger than 128 bit,
it takes the time to encrypt 12 blocks of data) remains acceptable in all kinds of applications.
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During the AES effort, it was suggested that an example of extreme case would be a high-speed
network switch having to maintain a million of contexts and switching bewteen them every four
blocks of data. Under such extreme constraints, one can still keep in memory one million fully
expanded keys at a negligible cost.
The second central property of FOX key-schedule algorithms is ensured by the LFSR con-
struction. As it is possible to back-clock it easily, the subkey generation process can be computed
in the encryption as well as in the decryption direction with no loss of speed. The third property
is ensured by our “Fibonacci-like” construction (which is a bijective mapping). Furthermore,
mkey is expanded by XORing constants depending on r and ek with no overlap on these con-
stants sequences (this was checked experimentally). Finally, the fourth property is ensured by
the dependency of the subkey sequence to the actual round number of the algorithm instance
for which the sequence will be used.
We state now a sequence of properties of the building blocks of the key-schedule algorithm.
3.3.1 P-Part
The goal of the P-part consists in transforming the user-provided key, which may have any
length multiple of 8 smaller or equal than 256, in a fixed-size value of 128-bit or 256-bit. The
chosen padding constant e− 2 was checked regarding the following property.
Lemma 3.1. It is impossible to find two values of k with a length strictly smaller than ek bits
which lead to the same value of pkey.
Proof. In order for two different inputs to produce the same output during the padding opera-
tion, one has to concatenate the smaller one with a padding value which is contained in the one
used for the larger input; this is only possible if the first ` bytes of the padding constant are
present in another location. The lemma follows from the fact that the first byte 0xB7 is unique
in the constant.
Note that in order to avoid that a padded key and non-padded key generate the same subkey
sequence, a conditional negation has been incorporated in the NLx part of the key-schedule
algorithm.
3.3.2 M-Part
When using small keys, a large part of the key-schedule state is known to a potential adversary:
it is the padding constant. The goal of the M-part is hence to mix the entropy on all bytes.
The following lemma insures that, when fed with two different inputs, the M-part will return
two different outputs.
Lemma 3.2. The M-part is a permutation.
Proof. The lemma follows directly from the fact that the M-part is an invertible application.
3.3.3 L-Part
The goal of the L-part is to diversify the dkey register (which serves as input for the NLx-part)
at each round. The main design goals are its simplicity and its reversibility: as a LFSR step is
equivalent to the multiplication by a constant in a finite field, the inverse operation is a division
by the same constant. It is thus possible to evaluate the L in both directions. It was furthermore
checked that the outputs (being 144 or 264 bits) for all 12 ≤ r ≤ 255 and for all round numbers




Figure 14: An alternate view of an extended Lai-Massey scheme
3.3.4 NLx-Part
The goal of the NL part is to generate a pseudorandom stream of data as “cryptographically
secure” as possible and as fast as possible; it is actually the one-way part of the key-schedule.
For this, it re-uses the round functions in its core, and it needs only a few supplementary
operations.
3.4 Security Foundations
3.4.1 Security Properties of the Lai-Massey Scheme
Although less popular than the Feistel scheme or SPN structures, the Lai-Massey scheme of-
fers similar (super-) pseudorandomness and decorrelation inheritance properties, as was demon-
strated by Vaudenay [Vau00]. Note that we will indifferently use the term “Lai-Massey scheme”
to denote both versions, as we can see the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as a Lai-Massey
scheme: we can swap the two inner inputs as in Fig. 14, and we note that the function
(x, y) 7→ or32(x)||or32(y) builds an orthomorphism (see Lem. 3.3).
Lemma 3.3. The application defined by
{
({0, 1}32)2 → ({0, 1}32)2
(x, y) 7→ (or(x), or(y))
is an orthomorphism, where or(.) is the orthomorphism defined in §2.2.3.
Proof. First, we show that this application is a permutation. This follows from the fact that
the inverse application is given by
(x′, y′) 7→ (io(x′), io(y′))
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and that io is a permutation, too. Now, we have to check that
(x, y) 7→ (or(x)⊕ x, or(y)⊕ y) (2)
is also a permutation. This follows easily from the fact that Eq. (2) is an invertible application.
From this point, we will make use of the following notation: given an orthomorphism o on a
group (G,+) and given r functions f1, f2, . . . , fr on G, we note an r-rounds Lai-Massey scheme
using the r functions and the orthomorphism by Λo(f1, . . . , fr). Then the following results are
two Luby-Rackoff-like [LR88] results on the Lai-Massey scheme. We refer to [Vau00, Vau03] for
proofs thereof.




3 be three independent random functions uniformly
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Theorem 3.2 (Vaudenay). If f1, . . . , fr are r ≥ 3 independent random functions on a group
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3c.
Basically, the first result proves that the Lai-Massey scheme provides pseudorandomness on
three rounds unless the fi’s are weak, like for the Feistel scheme [Fei73]. Super-pseudorandom-
ness corresponds to cases where a distinguisher can query chosen ciphertexts as well; in this
scenario, the previous result holds when we consider Λo(f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
4 ) with a fourth round. The
second result proves that the decorrelation bias of the round functions of a Lai-Massey scheme
is inherited by the whole structure: provided the fi’s are strong, so is the Lai-Massey scheme; in
other words, a potential cryptanalysis will not be able to exploit the Lai-Massey’s scheme only,
but it will have to take advantage of weaknesses of the round functions’ internal structure. We
would like to stress out the importance of the orthomorphism o: by omitting it, it is possible
to distinguish a Lai-Massey scheme using pseudorandom functions from a pseudorandom per-
mutation with overwhelming probability, and this for any number of rounds. Indeed, denoting
the input and the output of a Lai-Massey scheme by xl||xr and yl||yr, respectively, the following
equation holds with probability one:
xl 	 xr = yl 	 yr (3)
where 	 denote the inverse of the additive group law used in the scheme.
One should not misinterpret the results in the Luby-Rackoff scenario in terms of the overall
block cipher security: FOX’s round functions are far to be indistinguishable from random func-
tions, as it is the case of DES round functions, for instance: the fact that DES is vulnerable to
linear and differential cryptanalysis does not contradict Luby-Rackoff results. However, Th. 3.1
and Th. 3.2 give proper credit to the high-level structure of FOX.
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3.4.2 Resistance w/r to Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis
It is possible to prove some important results about the security of both f32 and f64 functions
towards linear and differential cryptanalysis, too. As these functions may be viewed as classical
Substitution-Permutation Network constructions, we will refer to some well-known results on
their resistance towards linear and differential cryptanalysis proved in [HLL+01] by Hong et
al. For the sake of completeness, we recall the framework of consideration and the results they
obtained using it. Then, we apply their result to the round functions of FOX, and we draw
some conclusions about its security towards linear and differential cryptanalysis in functions of
the round number. This will help us to fix the minimal number of rounds which results in a
sufficient level of security.
Let Si denote an m×m bijective substitution box, that is a bijection on {0, 1}
m. We consider
a standard kSPkSk structure (i.e. the one of FOX’s round functions) on m×n bit strings, namely
a key addition layer, a substitution layer, a diffusion layer, followed by a second key addition
layer, a substitution layer, and a final key addition layer. We assume that the substitution layer
consists of the parallel evaluation of n m×m S-boxes Si for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, that the diffusion layer
can be expressed as an invertible n× n MDS matrix M with coefficients in GF(2m), and that









the respective maximal differential and linear probabilities we can find in the S-boxes Si. Finally,
let us denote by
β = B(M) = n + 1
the branch number of the diffusion layer M (according to [DR02] ), which is defined to be
maximal. Then the following theorem due to Hong. et al. [HLL+01] states upper bounds on the
maximal differential and linear hull probabilities, respectively.
Theorem 3.3 (Hong et al.[HLL+01]). In a kSPkSk structure, if the round subkeys are
statistically independent and uniformly distributed, then the probability of each differential with









In the case of FOX64, since DPsboxmax = LP
sbox
max = 2
−4, since mu4 (resp. mu8) has a branch
number equal to five (resp. nine), and since one can assume that the subkeys are uniformly
distributed and statistically independent, due to the nature of the key-schedule algorithm, one
can reasonably apply Th. 3.3 and get the following result.
Theorem 3.4. If the round subkeys are statistically independent and uniformly distributed,












Figure 15: A detailed view of an extended Lai-Massey scheme
Let us now focus on embedding the round functions in the skeletons. For the sake of clarity3, we
prove now some interesting properties of an Extended Lai-Massey scheme regarding differential
and linear characteristics.
Lemma 3.4. In the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as defined in §2.1.2, any differential charac-
teristic on two rounds must involve at least one f64-function.
Proof. We follow a top-down approach. If we stack up two rounds of an Extended Lai-Massey
scheme (see Fig. 15 for a detailed illustration of one round) and we force a differential charac-
teristic at the input of the first f64-function to be equal to 0, then a differential characteristic
at the input of the two rounds must have the form (a, b, a, b, c, d, c, d) with a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}16
and a, b, c, d are not all equal to 0. At the end of the first round, the differential characteristic
sounds (b, a⊕ b, a, b, d, c⊕ d, c, d). At the input of the second f64-function, the differential char-
acteristic is equal to (a⊕ b, a, c⊕d, c). We proceed by contraposition. If the input of the second
f64-function is equal to zero, we have a = c = 0. As a ⊕ b and c ⊕ d must be both equal to 0,
the we conclude that a = b = c = d = 0. This is a contradiction to our primary assumption
about a, b, c and d, and the theorem follows.
Lemma 3.5. In the Extended Lai-Massey scheme as defined in Fig. 2.1.2, any linear charac-
teristic on two rounds must involve at least one function f64.
Proof. We follow a bottom-up approach. By forcing a linear characteristic to be equal to
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) at the end of the second f64-function, we note that the output linear charac-
teristic must have the form (a, a⊕d, a⊕d, d, b, b⊕c, b⊕c, c) with a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1}16 and a, b, c, d
not all equal to 0. If we consider now the first f64-function, we note that a linear characteristic
at its output must have the form (d, a⊕ d, b, b⊕ c), which implies that a = b = 0 and then that
c = d = 0, which is a contradiction to our assumption, and the theorem follows.
3These properties are actually trivial to prove in the case of a simple Lai-Massey scheme, and as discussed in
§3.4.1, the Extended Lai-Massey scheme can be viewed as a simple Lai-Massey scheme.
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By considering Th. 3.3, Lem. 3.4, and Lem. 3.5 together, we have thus the following result.
Theorem 3.5. The differential (resp. linear) probability of any single-path characteristic in
FOX64/k/r is upper bounded by (DPsboxmax)
2r (resp. (LPsboxmax)




Note that it is a kind of “hybrid” proof of security towards linear and differential cryptanalysis,
as we have considered differential and linear hulls in the round functions, but characteristics in
the high-level schemes. Thus, we have in reality slightly stronger results that the ones stated
in Th. 3.5. Finally, we conclude that it is impossible to find any useful differential or linear
characteristic after 8 rounds for both FOX64 and FOX128. Hence, a minimal number of 12
rounds provides a minimal safety margin.
3.4.3 Resistance Towards Other Attacks
In this part, we discuss the resistance of FOX towards various types of attacks.
Statistical Attacks Due to the very high diffusion properties of FOX’s round functions, the
high algebraic degree of the sbox mapping, and the high number of rounds, we are strongly
convinced that FOX will resist to known variants of linear and differential cryptanalysis (like
differential-linear cryptanalysis [LH94, BDK02], boomerang [Wag99] and rectangle [BDK01] at-
tacks), as well as generalizations thereof, like Knudsen’s truncated and higher-order differentials
[Knu95], impossible differentials [BBS99], and Harpes’ partitioning cryptanalysis [HM97], for
instance.
Slide and Related-Key Attacks Slide attacks [BW99, BW00] exploit periodic key-schedule
algorithms, which is not a property of FOX’s key-schedule algorithms. Furthermore, due to
very good diffusion and the high non-linearity of the key-schedule, related-key attacks are very
unlikely to be effective against FOX.
Interpolation and Algebraic Attacks Interpolation attacks [JK97] take advantage of S-
boxes exhibiting a simple algebraic structure. Since FOX’s non-linear mapping sbox does not
possess any simple relation over GF(2) or GF(28), such attacks are certainly not effective.
One of our main concerns was to avoid a pure algebraic construction for the sbox mapping,
as it is the case for a large number of modern designs of block ciphers. Although such S-
boxes have many interesting non-linear properties, they probably form the best conditions to
express a block cipher as a system of sparse, over-defined low-degree multivariate polynomial
equations over GF(2) or GF(28); this fact may lead to effective attacks, as argued by Courtois
and Pieprzyk in [CP02].
Not choosing an algebraic construction for sbox does not necessarily ensure security towards
algebraic attacks. Note that we base our non-linear mapping on “small” permutations, mapping
4 bits to 4 bits, and that, according to [CP02], any such mapping can always be written as an
overdefined system of at least 21 quadratic equations: let us denote the input (resp. the output)
of such a small S-box by x1||x2||x3||x4 (resp. by y1||y2||y3||y4), and if we consider a 16 × 37
matrix containing in each row the values of the t = 37 monomials
{1, x1, . . . , x4, y1, . . . , y4, x1x2, . . . , x1y1, . . . , y3y4}
for each of the 16 possible entries, we note that its rank can be at most 16, thus, for any S-box,
there will be at least ρ ≥ 37 − 16 = 21 quadratic equations. We have checked that the rank
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of these matrices for FOX’s small S-boxes S1, S2, and S3 are equal to 16, and there exist thus





for sbox. Following the very same methodology than [CP02], it appears that XSL
attacks would break members of the FOX family within a complexity4 of 2139 to 2156, depending
on the block size and on the rounds number.
Namely, we can construct an overdefined multivariate system of quadratic equations describ-
ing FOX using the XSL approach, which aims at recovering all the subkeys, without taking care
of the key-schedule algorithm. Let us assume that FOX has r rounds, and thus r subkeys with
the same size than the plaintext. We need hence r known plaintext-ciphertext pairs to uniquely
determine the key. We use from now on the same notations than in [CP02]. S is defined to be
the total number of substitution boxes considered during an attack. Hence,
SFOX64 = 3 · 8 · r
2
for FOX64, and
SFOX128 = 3 · 16 · r
2
as each substitution box sbox is built from three small S-boxes on {0, 1}s, with s = 4. Let t
denote the number of monomials (i.e. t = 37 in our case), let t′ being the number of terms in
the basis for one S-box that can be multiplied by some fixed variable and are still in the basis
(we have t′ = 5 in the case of FOX). Then, Courtois and Pieprzyk [CP02] estimate that the
complexity of a XSL attack can be estimated to





where ω is the best possible exponent for Gaussian elimination, T represents the total number












According to Courtois and Pieprzyk [CP02], in order that the attack works, as difference oper-
ation) it is necessary to choose P such that
R
T − T ′
≥ 1 (4)
where





represents the total number of equations, and





is the total number of terms in the basis that can be multiplied by some fixed variable and
are still in the basis. Eq. (4), in the case which interests us, is already fullfiled for P = 4, but
R ≈ 1. As the overall complexity of the attack is very sensitive to the value of P , and according
to Courtois and Pieprzyk [CP02],
4Under the most pessimistic hypotheses.
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P = 4 P = 5
S ω = 2.376 ω = 3 ω = 2.376 ω = 3
FOX64/k/12 3456 2139 2175 2171 2216
FOX64/k/16 6144 2147 2185 2181 2228
FOX128/k/12 6912 2148 2187 2183 2231
FOX128/k/16 12288 2156 2197 2192 2243
Figure 16: Estimations of the complexity of Courtois-Pieprzyk attacks against FOX
Though XSL attacks will probably always work for some P , we considered the min-
imum value P for which R
T−T ′ ≥ 1. This condition is necessary, but probably not
sufficient.
we will consider the cases P = 4 as well as P = 5 in our estimations of the complexity of
applying algebraic attacks to FOX.
Another subject of controversy is the value of ω, i.e. the complexity exponent of a Gaussian
reduction. Courtois and Pieprzyk [CP02] assume that ω = 2.376, which is the best known
value obtained by Coppersmith and Winograd [CW90]. According to [CP02], the constant
factor in this algorithm is unknown to the authors of [CW90], and is expected to be very big.
Accordingly, it is disputed whether such an algorithm can be applied efficiently in practice. For
this reason, we will consider both ω = 2.376 and ω = 3 in our estimations.
A summary of our estimations is given in Fig. 16. At the light of the previous discussion,
we should interpret these figures with an extreme care: on the one hand, the real complexity of
XSL attacks is by no means clear at the time of writing and is the subject of much controversy
[MR03]; one the other hand, we feel that the advantages of a small hardware footprint overcome
such a (possible) security decrease.
Integral Attacks Integral attacks [KW02] apply to ciphers operating on well-aligned data,
like SPN structures. As the round functions of FOX are SPNs, one can wonder whether it is
possible to find an integral distinguisher on the whole structure and we show now that it is
indeed the case. Let us consider the case of FOX64: we denote the input bytes by xi(8) with
0 ≤ i ≤ 7 and the output of the third round lmid64 by yi(8) with 0 ≤ i ≤ 7. We have the
following integral distinguisher on 3 rounds of FOX64.
Theorem 3.6. Let x3(8) = a, x7(8) = a ⊕ c, and xi(8) = c for i = 0, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, where c is an
arbitrary constant. We consider plaintext structures x(j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ 256 where a takes all 256


































Proof. See Fig. 17, where “C” denotes a constant byte, “A” denotes an active byte, and “S”
denotes a byte, whose sum under the structure is equal to zero.
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This integral distinguisher can be used to break (four, five) six rounds of FOX64 (by guessing the
one, two, or three last round keys and testing the integral criterion for each subkey candidate on
a few structures of plaintexts) within a complexity of about (272, 2136) 2200 partial decryptions
and negligible memory. A similar property may be used to break up to 4 rounds of FOX128 (by
guessing the last round key) with a complexity of about 2136 operations and negligible memory.
4 Implementation
In this part, we discuss several issues about the implementation of the FOX family on low-
end 8-bit architectures and on high-end 32/64-bit ones. Finally, we give results about the
performances of various implementations we have written on different platforms.
4.1 8-bit Architectures
The resources representing the most important bottleneck in a block cipher implementation on
a smartcard (which uses typically low-cost, 8-bit microprocessors) is of course the RAM usage.
The amount of efficiently usable RAM available on a smartcard is typically in the order of 256
bytes. It may be a bit larger depending on the cases, but as this type of smart card is devoted to
contain more than a simple encryption routine, FOX implementations on this kind of platforms
will minimize the amount of necessary RAM. ROM is not so scarce as RAM on a smartcard, so
the code size can be greater than the RAM usage. It is usually reasonable not to have a ROM
size (instructions + possible precomputed tables) greater than 1024 bytes.
4.1.1 Four Memory Usage Strategies
Obviously, the most intensive computation are related to the evaluation of the sbox mapping and
of the mu4 and mu8 mappings. We propose in the following four different (the last one concerning
uniquely FOX128) strategies using various amounts of precomputed data to implement these
mappings; they are summarized in Fig. 18. Note that the precomputed data may be stored in
ROM and that the constants needed in the key-schedule algorithm are not taken into account.
Strategy A can be applied when extremely few memory is available. For this, one computes on-





The sole needed constants are the small substitution boxes S1, S2 and S3 (see Fig. 13). Strategy
A is clearly the slowest one. A significant speed gain can be obtained if one precomputes the
sbox mapping (Strategy B), the finite field operations being all computed dynamically. A third
possibility (Strategy C) is to precompute two more mappings: talpha(x) is a function mapping




; dalpha(x) is a function mapping an




to α−1 · x. Finally, in the case of FOX128, a further speed gain may be
obtained (Strategy D) by tabulating the five following mappings:
sbox(x) : x 7→ sbox(x)
stalpha(x) : x 7→ sbox(x) · α
sdalpha(x) : x 7→ sbox(x) · α−1
stalpha2(x) : x 7→ sbox(x) · α2


















Figure 17: Integral Distinguisher in 3 rounds of FOX64.
Strategy Precomputations Data size
A No precomputed data 24 B
B sbox 256 B
C sbox, talpha, dalpha 768 B
D sbox, stalpha, sdalpha, stalpha2, sdalpha2 1280 B
Figure 18: Four different strategies to implement FOX on low-end microprocessors
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The implementation of the sigma4/mu4 layer is relatively straighforward:
y0(8) = sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x2(8))⊕
α · sbox(x3(8))
y1(8) = sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x3(8))⊕ α · sbox(x2(8))
⊕α−1 · sbox(x1(8))
y2(8) = sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x2(8))⊕ sbox(x3(8))⊕ α · sbox(x1(8))
⊕α−1 · sbox(x0(8))
y3(8) = sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x2(8))⊕ sbox(x3(8))⊕ α · sbox(x0(8))
⊕α−1 · sbox(x2(8))
By carefully rewriting the above equations and by re-using some temporary results, one can
easily minimize the number of sbox, talpha, dalpha evaluations and the number of ⊕ operations.
However, the resulting implementation is strongly dependent of the chosen strategy.
The implementation of the sigma8/mu8 layer is not much complicated. By rewriting the
operations as done above, one can easily obtain a fast implementation. For instance, in case of
an implementation following memory strategy C, one can obtain the following computations:
y0(8) = sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x2(8))⊕ sbox(x3(8))⊕
sbox(x4(8))⊕ sbox(x5(8))⊕ sbox(x6(8))⊕ α · sbox(x7(8))
y1(8) = sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x7(8))⊕
α ·
(






−1 · (sbox(x2(8))⊕ sbox(x6(8)))
)
y2(8) = sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x6(8))⊕ sbox(x7(8))⊕
α ·
(






−1 · (sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x5(8)))
)
y3(8) = sbox(x5(8))⊕ sbox(x6(8))⊕ sbox(x7(8))⊕
α ·
(






−1 · (sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x4(8)))
)
y4(8) = sbox(x4(8))⊕ sbox(x5(8))⊕ sbox(x7(8))⊕
α ·
(






−1 · (sbox(x3(8))⊕ sbox(x6(8)))
)
y5(8) = sbox(x3(8))⊕ sbox(x4(8))⊕ sbox(x7(8))⊕
α ·
(






−1 · (sbox(x2(8))⊕ sbox(x5(8)))
)
y6(8) = sbox(x2(8))⊕ sbox(x3(8))⊕ sbox(x7(8))⊕
α ·
(






−1 · (sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x4(8)))
)
y7(8) = sbox(x1(8))⊕ sbox(x2(8))⊕ sbox(x7(8))⊕
α ·
(






−1 · (sbox(x0(8))⊕ sbox(x3(8)))
)
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This computation flow (consisting of 71 ⊕, 15 talpha and 15 dalpha evaluations) is obviously
not optimal in terms of operations; by using redundant temporary computations, one can spare
a few more operations.
We give now a constant-time implementation of talpha and dalpha. The routines talpha2 and
dalpha2 can be implemented by iterating twice talpha and dalpha, respectively. Note that these
implementations do not take into account security issues related to other side-channel attacks,
like SPA/DPA.
;; Implementation of talpha() on 8051
;;
;; R0 : input
;; R0 : output
MOV A, R0 ;; A := R0
RLC A ;; left rotation through carry
MOV R0, A ;; storing the result
CLR A ;; A := 0
SUBB A, #0 ;; C set ? A = 0xFF : A = 0x00
ANL A, #F9 ;; C set ? A = 0xF9 : A = 0x00
XRL A, R0 ;; A := A XOR R0
MOV R0, A ;; R0 := A
;; Implementation of dalpha() on 8051
;;
;; R0 : input
;; R0 : output
MOV A, R0 ;; A := R0
RRC A ;; left rotation through carry
MOV R0, A ;; storing the result
CLR A ;; A := 0
SUBB A, #0 ;; C set ? A = 0xFF : A = 0x00
ANL A, #FC ;; C set ? A = 0xFC : A = 0x00
XRL A, R0 ;; A := A XOR R0
MOV R0, A ;; R0 := A
4.2 32/64-bit Architectures
Most modern CPUs architecture are 32- or 64-bit ones. In this section, we list several ways to
optimize an implementation of FOX in terms of speed (i.e. of throughput).
4.2.1 Subkeys Precomputation
Most of the time, block ciphers are used to encrypt several blocks of data, so it is very time-
sparing to precompute the subkeys once for all and to store them in a table. Typically, one
needs 128 bytes of memory to store all the subkeys for an implementation of FOX64 with 16
rounds and twice as much for FOX128.
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4.2.2 Implementation of f32 and f64 using Table-Lookups
The f32 and f64 functions can be implemented very efficiently using a combinations of table-
lookups and XORs. We will focus on the f32 function, but the considerations are similar for
which concerns f64. Let x0(8)||x1(8)||x2(8)||x3(8) be an input of f32. We denote the temporary re-
sult obtained after the mu4 application by t0(8)||t1(8)||t2(8)||t3(8). Let rk0(8)||rk1(8)||rk2(8)||rk3(8)
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 = TBSM0[v0(8)]⊕ TBSM1[v1(8)]⊕ TBSM2[v2(8)]⊕ TBSM3[v3(8)]
Similarly, we can denote the temporary result after the second key-addition layer of f32 before the
last substitution layer by u0(8)||u1(8)||u2(8)||u3(8) and by w0(8)||w1(8)||w2(8)||w3(8), the temporary











































 = TBS0[u0(8)]⊕ TBS1[u1(8)]⊕ TBS2[u2(8)]⊕ TBS3[u3(8)]
As outlined before, the process is similar for the implementation of the f64 function. In this case,
we have to define two times 8 tables of 256 64-bit elements. The following table summarizes
the size of the various tables for a fully-precomputed implementation :
number of tables width [bytes] total size [bytes]
FOX64 2× 4 4 8192
FOX128 2× 8 8 32768
Depending on the target processor, the nearest cache (i.e. the fastest memory) size may be
smaller than 32768 bytes. In this case, one can spare half of the tables (at the cost of a
few masking operations) by noting that all the TBS tables are “embedded” in the TBSM ones;
this implementation strategy will by denoted half-precomputed implementation. This allows to
reduce the fast memory needs to 4096 and 16384 bytes, respectively. Fig. 19 summarizes the
best strategies for various amounts of L1 cache memory.
For most modern microprocessors (denoted by ∗ in Fig. 19), a fully-precomputed imple-
mentation of FOX64 and FOX128 is probably the fastest possible solution. For the processors
denoted by • , a half-precompted implementation is likely the best solution. The supplemen-
tary masking operations may be furthermore used to increase the instructions throughput on
pipelined architectures.
Some microprocessors have a very small L1 data cache (they are denoted in ? in Fig. 19). In
the case of FOX128, even a half-precomputed implementation will result in many caches misses,
inducing a performance penalty. For early versions of Intel Pentium IV, a half-precomputed
implementation of FOX64 is advantageous, while one can reduce the size of the precomputed data
needed for a FOX128 implementation down to 8192 bytes at the cost of at most 18 supplementary
PSHUFW instructions. Although these operations will result in a performance penalty, the latter
will be reduced since the highly-parrallelizable structure of the f64 function allows to fully use the
pipeline and thus to improve the instructions throughput. As most modern CPU architectures
are pipelined ones, one can take this fact into account in order to improve performances of
FOX implementations. There are two “dependency walls” in a FOX round function. The first
one is just after the first subkey addition, the second one just after the second subkey addition.
Inbetween, the additions of the table-lookup results may be done in any order, as an XOR is a
commutative addition.
FOX128 is an excellent candidate for using the 64-bit instructions of actual 32-bit micro-
processors. For instance, on the Intel architecture, the MMX/SSE/SSE2/SSE3 instruction sets
may be used to “emulate” a 64-bit microprocessor. Furthermore, by expressing the Extended
Lai-Massey scheme as in Fig. 14, one can compute very efficiently the two orthomorphisms as
a single one on 64-bit architectures.
In order to get the best performances for FOX implementations written in a high-level
language, one can get large speed differences when using different compilers. Furthermore, the
choice of the data structure of the precomputed tables and of the data to be encrypted plays an
important role: implementing a simple way to access these data will result in a speed increase.
4.2.3 Key-Schedule Algorithms
For applications needing a high key-agility, one can implement the various key-schedule algo-
rithms using the same guidelines and tricks as for the core algorithm, since they share many
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Processor cache size [kB] Note Best Strategy
Alpha 21164 8 (data) ?
Alpha 21264 64 (data) ∗
AMD Athlon XP 128 (data + code) ∗
AMD Athlon MP 128 (data + code) ∗
AMD Opteron 64 (data) ∗
Intel Pentium III 16 (data) •
Intel Pentium IV 8/16 (Prescott) (data) ? / •
Intel Xeon 8 (data) ?
Intel Itanium 16 (data) •
Intel Itanium2 16 (data) •
PowerPC G4 32 (data + code) •
PowerPC G5 32 (data) ∗
UltraSparc II 16 (data) •
UltraSparc III 64 (data) ∗
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8 FOX64/16/64 key : 00112233 44556677
9 FOX64/16/64 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF
10 FOX64/16/64 ciphertext : 200E1F58 47D8A2CE




15 FOX64/16/128 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF
16 FOX64/16/128 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF
17 FOX64/16/128 ciphertext : B85D6B76 6DCE952E




22 FOX64/16/192 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988
23 FOX64/16/192 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF
24 FOX64/16/192 ciphertext : 2741D796 3406DACA




29 FOX64/16/256 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988 77665544 33221100
30 FOX64/16/256 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF
31 FOX64/16/256 ciphertext : 8A4EDFBC 36BEF7F6




36 FOX128/16/64 key : 00112233 44556677
37 FOX128/16/64 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210
38 FOX128/16/64 ciphertext : 1EECBC7D EB66E7DA E1A7876D 90C0B239




43 FOX128/16/128 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF
44 FOX128/16/128 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210
45 FOX128/16/128 ciphertext : 849E0F06 82F50CD5 88AE0730 06A10BEE





50 FOX128/16/192 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988
51 FOX128/16/192 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210
52 FOX128/16/192 ciphertext : 5934214E CBA2D5FD 58C261B2 8261B1BC




57 FOX128/16/256 key : 00112233 44556677 8899AABB CCDDEEFF FFEEDDCC BBAA9988 77665544 33221100
58 FOX128/16/256 message : 01234567 89ABCDEF FEDCBA98 76543210
59 FOX128/16/256 ciphertext : 45CCB103 0F67B768 247F5302 66BC4996




1 FOX / Reference implementation v1.2
2 Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
3 --------------------------------------------------
4
5 The sole purpose of this reference code is to output
6 a set of test vectors and to help understanding the
7 structure of FOX. It is not fast, not portable, not
8 elegant and not secure. It implements a full
9 precomputed table-lookup strategy.
10
11 The code has been written for the IA32 architecture,
12 which is a little-endian architecture. It won’t work
13 on a big-endian architecture.
14
15 Acknowledgments are due to Mounir Idrassi, Patrick Lattman,
16 Marco Macchetti, Emmanuel Prouff, and Chen Wenyu for their
17 help during the debugging process.
File Makefile
1 #############################################################
2 ## FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 ##




7 EXEC_NAME = fox_util
8
9 CFLAGS = -W -Wall -pedantic -g
10
11 objects = fox128.o fox64.o fox_ctx.o fox_cst.o fox_util.o
12
13 all: $(objects)
14 $(CC) -o $(EXEC_NAME) $(objects)
15
16 $(objects): %.o: %.c %.h
17 $(CC) -c $(CFLAGS) $< -o $@
18
19 .PHONY: clean debug
20
21 clean:





2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */
3 /* Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info> */
4 /* */








13 typedef signed char sint8;
14 typedef unsigned char uint8;
15
16 #if UINT_MAX >= 4294967295UL
17
18 typedef signed short sint16;
19 typedef signed int sint32;
20 typedef unsigned short uint16;
21 typedef unsigned int uint32;
22




27 typedef signed int sint16;
28 typedef signed long sint32;
29 typedef unsigned int uint16;
30 typedef unsigned long uint32;
31




36 #define ONE8 0xffU
37 #define ONE16 0xffffU
38
39 #define TO8(x) ((x) & ONE8)
40 #define TO16(x) ((x) & ONE16)
41 #define TO32(x) ((x) & ONE32)
42
43 #define EXTRACT8_BIT(d, b) ((((uint8)(d)) & ((uint8)0x1 << (b))) >> (b))
44 #define EXTRACT16_BIT(d, b) ((((uint16)(d)) & ((uint16)0x1 << (b))) >> (b))
45 #define EXTRACT32_BIT(d, b) ((((uint32)(d)) & ((uint32)0x1 << (b))) >> (b))
46
47 #define ROTL8(v, n) ((uint8)((v) << (n)) | ((uint8)(v) >> (8 - (n))))
48 #define ROTL16(v, n) ((uint16)((v) << (n)) | ((uint16)(v) >> (16 - (n))))
49 #define ROTL32(v, n) ((uint32)((v) << (n)) | ((uint32)(v) >> (32 - (n))))
50
51 /* U8TO32_BIG(c) returns the 32-bit value stored in big-endian convention */
52 /* in the unsigned char array pointed to by c. */
53
54 #define U8TO32_BIG(c) (((uint32)TO8(*(c)) << 24) | ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 1)) << 16) | \
55 ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 2)) << 8) |\
56 ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 3))))
57
58 /* U8TO32_LITTLE(c) returns the 32-bit value stored in little-endian */
59 /* convention in the unsigned char array pointed to by c. */
60
61 #define U8TO32_LITTLE(c) (((uint32)TO8(*(c))) | ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 1)) << 8) | \
62 ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 2)) << 16) | ((uint32)TO8(*((c) + 3)) << 24))
63
64
65 /* U32TO8_BIG(c, v) stores the 32-bit-value v in big-endian convention */
66 /* into the unsigned char array pointed to by c. */
67
68 #define U32TO8_BIG(c, v) do { \
69 uint32 x = (v); \
70 uint8 *d = (c); \
71 d[0] = TO8(x >> 24); \
45
72 d[1] = TO8(x >> 16); \
73 d[2] = TO8(x >> 8); \
74 d[3] = TO8(x); \
75 } while (0)
76
77 /* U32TO8_LITTLE(c, v) stores the 32-bit-value v in little-endian */
78 /* convention into the unsigned char array pointed to by c. */
79
80
81 #define U32TO8_LITTLE(c, v) do { \
82 uint32 x = (v); \
83 uint8 *d = (c); \
84 d[0] = TO8(x); \
85 d[1] = TO8(x >> 8); \
86 d[2] = TO8(x >> 16); \
87 d[3] = TO8(x >> 24); \
88 } while (0)
89
90 #endif /* _FOX_PORTABLE_H_ */
File fox error.h
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */







10 #define FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOC "\nError: memory allocation"
11 #define FOX_ERROR_CONTEXT_INIT "\nError: context initialization"
12 #define FOX_ERROR_TABLE_INIT "\nError: table initialization"
13 #define FOX_ERROR_KEY_INIT "\nError: key initialization"
14 #define FOX_ERROR_UNKNOWN_TABLE_ID "\nError: unknown table ID"
15 #define FOX_ERROR_UNKNOWN_MODE "\nError: unknown mode"
16 #define FOX_BUG "\nError: bug"
17
18 #endif /* _FOX_ERROR_H_ */
File fox cst.h
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */









12 /* Constants */
13
14 #define FOX_NUMBER_ROUNDS FOX_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN
15
16 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID0 0x00
17 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID1 0x01
18 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID2 0x02
19 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID3 0x03
20
21 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID0 0x04
22 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID1 0x05
23 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID2 0x06
24 #define FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID3 0x07
25
46
26 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID0 0x08
27 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID1 0x09
28 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID2 0x0A
29 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID3 0x0B
30
31 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID0 0x10
32 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID1 0x11
33 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID2 0x12
34 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID3 0x13
35 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID4 0x14
36 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID5 0x15
37 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID6 0x16
38 #define FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID7 0x17
39
40 /* FOX_IRRPOLY = x^8+x^7+x^6+x^5+x^4+x^3+1 */
41
42 #define FOX_IRRPOLY 0x1F9
43
44 /* Constants used in the key-schedule algorithm */
45
46 #define FOX_MKEYM2 0x6A
47 #define FOX_MKEYM1 0x76
48
49 #define FOX_LFSR_C 0x006A0000UL
50 #define FOX_LFSR_FP 0x0100001BUL
51
52
53 /* These are the first decimal of e-2 */
54
55 extern const uint8 FOX_KEY_PAD[32];
56
57 /* The three "small" S-boxes */
58
59 extern const uint8 FOX_S1[16];
60 extern const uint8 FOX_S2[16];
61 extern const uint8 FOX_S3[16];
62
63 #endif /* _FOX_CST_H_ */
File fox cst.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */







10 /* These are the first decimal of e-2 */
11
12 const uint8 FOX_KEY_PAD[32] = { 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x51, 0x62,
13 0x8A, 0xED, 0x2A, 0x6A,
14 0xBF, 0x71, 0x58, 0x80,
15 0x9C, 0xF4, 0xF3, 0xC7,
16 0x62, 0xE7, 0x16, 0x0F,
17 0x38, 0xB4, 0xDA, 0x56,
18 0xA7, 0x84, 0xD9, 0x04,
19 0x51, 0x90, 0xCF, 0xEF };
20
21 /* The three "small" S-boxes */
22
23 const uint8 FOX_S1[16] = { 0x2, 0x5, 0x1, 0x9,
24 0xE, 0xA, 0xC, 0x8,
25 0x6, 0x4, 0x7, 0xF,
26 0xD, 0xB, 0x0, 0x3 };
27
28 const uint8 FOX_S2[16] = { 0xB, 0x4, 0x1, 0xF,
47
29 0x0, 0x3, 0xE, 0xD,
30 0xA, 0x8, 0x7, 0x5,
31 0xC, 0x2, 0x9, 0x6 };
32
33 const uint8 FOX_S3[16] = { 0xD, 0xA, 0xB, 0x1,
34 0x4, 0x3, 0x8, 0x9,
35 0x5, 0x7, 0x2, 0xC,





2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */










13 /* Types */
14
15 typedef uint8 FOX_mode;
16
17







25 typedef FOX_key_ *FOX_key;
26






33 typedef FOX_table_ *FOX_table;
34













48 typedef FOX64_ctx_ *FOX64_ctx;
49


















67 typedef FOX128_ctx_ *FOX128_ctx;
68
69 /* Exportable routines */
70
71 extern int FOX64_init_ctx (FOX64_ctx *);
72 extern void FOX64_clean_ctx (FOX64_ctx);
73
74 extern int FOX128_init_ctx (FOX128_ctx *);
75 extern void FOX128_clean_ctx (FOX128_ctx);
76
77
78 extern int FOX64_init_key (FOX_key *,
79 const FOX64_ctx,




84 extern void FOX64_clean_key (FOX_key);
85
86 extern int FOX128_init_key (FOX_key *,
87 const FOX128_ctx,




92 extern void FOX128_clean_key (FOX_key);
93
94 extern void FOX_io (uint32 *);
95 extern void FOX_or (uint32 *);
96
97
98 /* Internal routines */
99
100 int FOX_init_table (FOX_table *, const uint8);
101 void FOX_clean_table (FOX_table);
102
103 uint32 FOX_times_alpha (const uint32);
104 uint32 FOX_div_alpha (const uint32);
105
106 uint32 FOX_eval_sbox (const uint32 x, const uint8 *s1,
107 const uint8 *s2, const uint8 *s3);
108
109
110 #endif /* _FOX_CTX_H_ */
File fox ctx.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */

















19 void FOX_or (uint32 *data)
20 {
21 uint32 l, r;
22
23 assert (data != NULL);
24
25 l = *data >> 16;
26 r = *data & 0xFFFF;
27
28 *data = (r << 16) | (l ^ r);
29 }
30
31 void FOX_io (uint32 *data)
32 {
33 uint32 l, r;
34
35 assert (data != NULL);
36
37 l = *data >> 16;
38 r = *data & 0xFFFF;
39
40 *data = (( l ^ r) << 16) | l;
41 }
42
43 uint32 FOX_times_alpha (const uint32 input)
44 {
45
46 if (input) {
47 return (input & 0x80) ? (input << 1) ^ FOX_IRRPOLY : input << 1;





53 uint32 FOX_div_alpha (const uint32 input)
54 {
55
56 if (input) {
57 return (input & 0x01) ? (input ^ FOX_IRRPOLY) >> 1 : input >> 1;









67 if ( (ctx = malloc (sizeof (FOX64_ctx_))) == NULL) {
68 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOC);
69 goto error_label;
70 }
71 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_mu4_0, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID0)) {
72 goto error_label;
73 }
74 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_mu4_1, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID1)) {
75 goto error_label;
76 }
77 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_mu4_2, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID2)) {
78 goto error_label;
79 }




83 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_0, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID0)) {
84 goto error_label;
85 }
86 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_1, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID1)) {
87 goto error_label;
88 }
89 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma4_2, FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_ID2)) {
90 goto error_label;
91 }
















108 void FOX64_clean_ctx (FOX64_ctx ctx)
109 {



















129 if ( (ctx = malloc (sizeof (FOX128_ctx_))) == NULL) {
130 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOC);
131 goto error_label;
132 }
133 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_0, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID0)) {
134 goto error_label;
135 }
136 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_1, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID1)) {
137 goto error_label;
138 }
139 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_2, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID2)) {
140 goto error_label;
141 }
142 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_3, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID3)) {
143 goto error_label;
144 }
145 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_4, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID4)) {
146 goto error_label;
147 }
148 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_5, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID5)) {
149 goto error_label;
150 }




154 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_mu8_7, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_MU8_ID7)) {
155 goto error_label;
156 }
157 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_0, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID0)) {
158 goto error_label;
159 }
160 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_1, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID1)) {
161 goto error_label;
162 }
163 if (FOX_init_table (&ctx->sigma8_2, FOX128_TABLE_SIGMA8_ID2)) {
164 goto error_label;
165 }















181 void FOX128_clean_ctx (FOX128_ctx ctx)
182 {



















202 int FOX64_init_key (FOX_key *ptr,
203 const FOX64_ctx ctx,
204 const uint8 *bytes,
205 const uint32 length,
206 const uint8 rounds)
207 {
208 FOX_key key;
209 uint32 i, j;
210 uint32 o;
211 uint8 pkey[32], mkey[32], dkey[32];
212 uint32 dkey32[8], temp32[8], reg32[8];




217 assert (ctx != NULL);
218
219 assert (length <= 256);
220 assert (length % 8 == 0);
221 assert (rounds >= FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN);
222
52
223 if ( (key = malloc (sizeof (FOX_key_))) == NULL) {
224 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOC);
225 goto error_label;
226 }
227 if ( (key->exp_key = malloc (sizeof (uint32) * 2 * rounds )) == NULL) {




232 memcpy (key->raw_key, bytes, (length >> 3));
233 memcpy (pkey, bytes, (length >> 3));
234
235 /* Size in bits */
236 key->key_length = length;
237
238 key->rounds = rounds;
239
240 /* Computation of the state bit b and of ek */
241
242 if ( (length == 128) || (length == 256) ) {
243 b = 1;
244 } else {
245 b = 0;
246 }
247
248 if (length <= 128) {
249 ek = 128;
250 } else {
251 ek = 256;
252 }
253
254 /* P-part */
255
256 if (length < ek) {
257 for (i = (length >> 3), j = 0; i < (ek >> 3); i++, j++) {




262 memcpy (mkey, pkey, (ek >> 3));
263
264 /* M-part */
265
266 if (length < ek) {
267 mkey[0] ^= (FOX_MKEYM2 + FOX_MKEYM1);
268 mkey[1] ^= (FOX_MKEYM1 + mkey[0]);
269 for (i = 2; i < (ek >> 3); i++) {




274 /* D-Part */
275
276 /* Initialization of the LFSR */
277 lfsr_state = FOX_LFSR_C | ((uint32)rounds << 8) | (~rounds & 0xFF);
278
279 /* We back-clock the LFSR once */
280 if (lfsr_state & 0x1) {
281 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
282 }
283 lfsr_state >>= 1;
284
285 for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
286 j = 0;
287 while (j < (ek >> 3)) {
288 if ( (j % 3) == 0 ) {
289 /* We have to clock the LFSR */
290 lfsr_state <<= 1;
291 if (lfsr_state & 0x01000000) {
292 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
53
293 }
294 /* Endianness issue here ! */
295 U32TO8_BIG (lfsr, lfsr_state);
296 }




301 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
302 dkey32[j] = U8TO32_BIG (dkey + (j << 2));
303 }
304
305 /* NL-part : we feed the current DKEY to the NLx part */
306 /* sigma4 - mu4 operation */
307 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
308 o = ctx->sigma4_mu4_0->val[(dkey32[j] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
309 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_1->val[(dkey32[j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
310 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_2->val[(dkey32[j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
311 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_3->val[(dkey32[j] & 0x000000FF)];
312 reg32[j] = o;
313 }
314
315 if (ek == 128) {
316 /* mix64 operation */
317 temp32[0] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[2] ^ reg32[3];
318 temp32[1] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[2] ^ reg32[3];
319 temp32[2] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[1] ^ reg32[3];
320 temp32[3] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[1] ^ reg32[2];
321 } else {
322 /* mix64h operation */
323 temp32[0] = reg32[2] ^ reg32[4] ^ reg32[6];
324 temp32[1] = reg32[3] ^ reg32[5] ^ reg32[7];
325 temp32[2] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[4] ^ reg32[6];
326 temp32[3] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[5] ^ reg32[7];
327 temp32[4] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[2] ^ reg32[6];
328 temp32[5] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[3] ^ reg32[7];
329 temp32[6] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[2] ^ reg32[4];
330 temp32[7] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[3] ^ reg32[5];
331 }
332 /* Constant addition */
333 /* Endianness issue here ! */
334 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
335 temp32[j] ^= U8TO32_BIG (FOX_KEY_PAD + (j << 2));
336 }
337 /* Conditional flip */
338 if (b) {
339 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {




344 /* sigma4 operation */
345 for (j = 0; j < (ek >> 5); j++) {
346 o = ctx->sigma4_0->val[(temp32[j] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
347 o ^= ctx->sigma4_1->val[(temp32[j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
348 o ^= ctx->sigma4_2->val[(temp32[j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
349 o ^= ctx->sigma4_3->val[(temp32[j] & 0x000000FF)];
350 temp32[j] = o;
351 }
352
353 if (ek == 128) {
354 /* Hashing */
355 reg32[0] = temp32[0] ^ temp32[2];
356 reg32[1] = temp32[1] ^ temp32[3];
357
358 /* Encryption phase */
359 FOX_lmor64 (reg32, dkey32, ctx);
360 FOX_lmid64 (reg32, dkey32 + 2, ctx);
361 *(key->exp_key + 2*i) = reg32[0];
362 *(key->exp_key + 2*i + 1) = reg32[1];
54
363 } else {
364 /* Hashing */
365 reg32[0] = temp32[0] ^ temp32[1];
366 reg32[1] = temp32[2] ^ temp32[3];
367 reg32[2] = temp32[4] ^ temp32[5];
368 reg32[3] = temp32[6] ^ temp32[7];
369
370 temp32[0] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[2];
371 temp32[1] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[3];
372
373 /* Encryption phase */
374 FOX_lmor64 (temp32, dkey32, ctx);
375 FOX_lmor64 (temp32, dkey32 + 2, ctx);
376 FOX_lmor64 (temp32, dkey32 + 4, ctx);
377 FOX_lmid64 (temp32, dkey32 + 6, ctx);
378 *(key->exp_key + 2*i) = temp32[0];














393 void FOX64_clean_key (FOX_key k)
394 {
395 if (k != NULL) {
396 if (k->exp_key != NULL) {
397 free (memset (k->exp_key, 0x00, k->rounds * 2 * sizeof (uint32)));
398 }




403 int FOX128_init_key (FOX_key *ptr,
404 const FOX128_ctx ctx,
405 const uint8 *bytes,
406 const uint32 length,
407 const uint8 rounds)
408 {
409 FOX_key key;
410 uint32 i, j;
411 uint32 o[2];
412 uint8 dkey[32], pkey[32], mkey[32];
413 uint32 dkey32[8], temp32[8], reg32[8];




418 assert (length <= 256);
419 assert (length % 8 == 0);
420 assert (rounds >= FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN);
421
422 if ( (key = malloc (sizeof (FOX_key_))) == NULL) {
423 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOC);
424 goto error_label;
425 }
426 if ( (key->exp_key = malloc (sizeof (uint32) * 4 * rounds )) == NULL) {




431 memcpy (key->raw_key, bytes, (length >> 3));
432 memcpy (pkey, bytes, (length >> 3));
55
433
434 /* Size in bits */
435
436 key->key_length = length;
437 key->rounds = rounds;
438
439 /* Computation of the state bit b and of ek */
440
441 if ( length == 256 ) {
442 b = 1;
443 } else {
444 b = 0;
445 }
446 ek = 256;
447
448
449 /* P-part */
450
451 if (length < ek) {
452 for (i = (length >> 3), j = 0; i < 32; i++, j++) {




457 memcpy (mkey, pkey, (ek >> 3));
458
459 /* M-part */
460
461 if (length < ek) {
462 mkey[0] ^= (FOX_MKEYM2 + FOX_MKEYM1);
463 mkey[1] ^= (FOX_MKEYM1 + mkey[0]);
464 for (i = 2; i < (ek >> 3); i++) {




469 /* D-Part */
470
471 /* Initialization of the LFSR */
472 lfsr_state = FOX_LFSR_C | ((uint32)rounds << 8) | (~rounds & 0xFF);
473
474 /* We back-clock the LFSR once */
475 if (lfsr_state & 0x1) {
476 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
477 }
478 lfsr_state >>= 1;
479
480 for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
481 j = 0;
482 while (j < (ek >> 3)) {
483 if ( (j % 3) == 0 ) {
484 /* We have to clock the LFSR */
485 lfsr_state <<= 1;
486 if (lfsr_state & 0x01000000) {
487 lfsr_state ^= FOX_LFSR_FP;
488 }
489 /* Endianness issue here ! */
490 U32TO8_BIG (lfsr, lfsr_state);
491 }




496 for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
497 dkey32[j] = U8TO32_BIG (dkey + (j << 2));
498 }
499
500 /* NL Part */
501
502 /* sigma8 - mu8 operation */
56
503 for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
504 o[0] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[ (dkey32[2*j] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
505 o[1] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
506 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[ (dkey32[2*j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
507 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
508 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[ (dkey32[2*j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
509 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
510 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[ (dkey32[2*j] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
511 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[((dkey32[2*j] & 0x000000FF) << 1)+ 1];
512
513 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
514 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
515 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
516 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
517 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
518 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
519 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[(dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
520 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[((dkey32[2*j+1] & 0x000000FF) << 1) + 1];
521
522 reg32[2*j] = o[0];
523 reg32[2*j + 1] = o[1];
524 }
525
526 /* mix128 operation */
527
528 temp32[0] = reg32[2] ^ reg32[4] ^ reg32[6];
529 temp32[1] = reg32[3] ^ reg32[5] ^ reg32[7];
530 temp32[2] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[4] ^ reg32[6];
531 temp32[3] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[5] ^ reg32[7];
532 temp32[4] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[2] ^ reg32[6];
533 temp32[5] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[3] ^ reg32[7];
534 temp32[6] = reg32[0] ^ reg32[2] ^ reg32[4];
535 temp32[7] = reg32[1] ^ reg32[3] ^ reg32[5];
536
537 /* Constant addition */
538 /* Endianness issue here ! */
539 for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {
540 temp32[j] ^= U8TO32_BIG (FOX_KEY_PAD + (j << 2));
541 }
542 /* Conditional flip */
543 if (b) {
544 for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) {




549 /* sigma8 operation */
550 for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
551 o[0] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(temp32[2*j] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
552 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(temp32[2*j] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
553 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(temp32[2*j] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
554 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(temp32[2*j] & 0x000000FF)];
555
556 o[1] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(temp32[2*j+1] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
557 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(temp32[2*j+1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
558 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(temp32[2*j+1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
559 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(temp32[2*j+1] & 0x000000FF)];
560
561 temp32[2*j] = o[0];
562 temp32[2*j + 1] = o[1];
563 }
564
565 reg32[0] = temp32[0] ^ temp32[4];
566 reg32[1] = temp32[1] ^ temp32[5];
567 reg32[2] = temp32[2] ^ temp32[6];
568 reg32[3] = temp32[3] ^ temp32[7];
569
570 /* Encryption phase */
571 FOX_elmor128 (reg32, dkey32, ctx);
572 FOX_elmid128 (reg32, dkey32 + 4, ctx);
57
573
574 *(key->exp_key + 4*i) = reg32[0];
575 *(key->exp_key + 4*i + 1) = reg32[1];
576 *(key->exp_key + 4*i + 2) = reg32[2];
577 *(key->exp_key + 4*i + 3) = reg32[3];
578 }
579










590 void FOX128_clean_key (FOX_key k)
591 {
592 if (k != NULL) {
593 if (k->exp_key != NULL) {
594 free (memset (k->exp_key, 0x00, k->rounds *
595 4 * sizeof (uint32)));
596 }




601 int FOX_init_table (FOX_table *ptr, const uint8 id)
602 {
603 uint32 i, size, tmp;
604 FOX_table table;
605
606 if ( (table = malloc (sizeof (FOX_table_))) == NULL) {




611 if (id >= 0x8) {
612 size = 2;
613 } else {
614 size = 1;
615 }
616
617 if ( (table->val = malloc (256 * sizeof(uint32) * size)) == NULL) {
618 fprintf (stderr, FOX_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOC);
619 goto error_label;
620 }
621 table->id = id;
622 table->size_bytes = 256 * sizeof(uint32) * size;
623
624 switch (id) {
625
626 case FOX64_TABLE_SIGMA4_MU4_ID0:
627 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
628 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
629 table->val[i] = tmp << 24;
630 table->val[i] |= tmp << 16;
631 table->val[i] |= (FOX_div_alpha(tmp) ^ tmp) << 8;





637 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
638 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
639 table->val[i] = tmp << 24;
640 table->val[i] |= (FOX_div_alpha(tmp) ^ tmp) << 16;
641 table->val[i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 8;






647 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
648 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
649 table->val[i] = tmp << 24;
650 table->val[i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 16;
651 table->val[i] |= tmp << 8;





657 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
658 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
659 table->val[i] = FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 24;
660 table->val[i] |= tmp << 16;
661 table->val[i] |= tmp << 8;





667 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
668 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
669 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
670 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 16;
671 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 8;
672 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp)));
673 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 24;
674 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
675 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 8;





681 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
682 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
683 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
684 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 16;
685 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 8;
686 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp);
687 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 24;
688 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 16;
689 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 8;





695 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
696 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
697 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
698 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 16;
699 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 8;
700 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp));
701 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 24;
702 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
703 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 8;





709 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
710 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
711 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
712 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 16;
59
713 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 8;
714 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp);
715 table->val[2*i+1] = FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 24;
716 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 16;
717 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 8;





723 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
724 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
725 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
726 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
727 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 8;
728 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp));
729 table->val[2*i+1] = tmp << 24;
730 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 16;
731 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 8;





737 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
738 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
739 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
740 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (tmp) << 16;
741 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 8;
742 table->val[2*i] |= tmp;
743 table->val[2*i+1] = (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 24;
744 table->val[2*i+1] |= (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 16;
745 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 8;





751 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
752 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
753 table->val[2*i] = tmp << 24;
754 table->val[2*i] |= FOX_div_alpha (FOX_div_alpha (tmp)) << 16;
755 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 8;
756 table->val[2*i] |= (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp);
757 table->val[2*i+1] = (FOX_div_alpha (tmp ^ FOX_div_alpha (tmp))) << 24;
758 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (tmp) << 16;
759 table->val[2*i+1] |= FOX_times_alpha (FOX_times_alpha (tmp)) << 8;





765 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
766 tmp = FOX_eval_sbox (i, FOX_S1, FOX_S2, FOX_S3);
767 table->val[2*i] = (FOX_times_alpha (tmp) ^ tmp) << 24;
768 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 16;
769 table->val[2*i] |= tmp << 8;
770 table->val[2*i] |= tmp;
771 table->val[2*i+1] = tmp << 24;
772 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 16;
773 table->val[2*i+1] |= tmp << 8;






780 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {







787 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {






794 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {






801 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {




















822 void FOX_clean_table (FOX_table table)
823 {
824 if (table != NULL) {
825 if (table->val != NULL) {
826 free (memset (table->val, 0x00, table->size_bytes));
827 }




832 uint32 FOX_eval_sbox (const uint32 x, const uint8 *s1,
833 const uint8 *s2, const uint8 *s3)
834 {
835 uint8 l, r, ll, lr, state;
836
837 assert ( (x <= 0xFF) && (s1 != NULL) && (s2 != NULL) && (s3 != NULL) );
838
839 l = (x & 0xF0) >> 4;
840 r = (x & 0x0F);
841
842 /* Round 1 */
843
844 state = s1[l ^ r];
845 l ^= state;
846 r ^= state;
847
848 ll = (l & 0xC) >> 2;
849 lr = (l & 0x3);
850
851 l = (lr << 2) | (ll ^ lr);
852
61
853 /* Stage 2 */
854
855 state = s2[l ^ r];
856 l ^= state;
857 r ^= state;
858
859 ll = (l & 0xC) >> 2;
860 lr = (l & 0x3);
861
862 l = (lr << 2) | (ll ^ lr);
863
864 /* Stage 3 (without orthomorphism) */
865
866 state = s3[l ^ r];
867 l ^= state;
868 r ^= state;
869
870 /* Saving of the value */
871




2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */










13 #define FOX64_MODE_ENCRYPT 0x0
14 #define FOX64_MODE_DECRYPT 0x1
15
16 #define FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN 12
17 #define FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_GENERIC 16
18
19 #define FOX64_encrypt(p, k, ctx) FOX64_process((p), (k), (ctx), FOX64_MODE_ENCRYPT)
20 #define FOX64_decrypt(c, k, ctx) FOX64_process((c), (k), (ctx), FOX64_MODE_DECRYPT)
21
22 extern int FOX64_process (uint32 *, const FOX_key, const FOX64_ctx, const FOX_mode);
23
24 void FOX_lmor64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
25 void FOX_lmid64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
26 void FOX_lmio64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
27 void FOX_f32 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX64_ctx);
28
29 #endif /* _FOX64_H_ */
File fox64.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */














16 int FOX64_process (uint32 *data,
17 const FOX_key k,
18 const FOX64_ctx ctx,





24 assert (data != NULL);
25 assert (k != NULL);
26 assert (ctx != NULL);
27
28 assert (k->rounds >= FOX64_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN);
29
30 input[0] = data[0];
31 input[1] = data[1];
32
33 switch (mode) {
34
35 case FOX64_MODE_ENCRYPT:
36 for (r = 0; r < k->rounds - 1; r++) {
37 FOX_lmor64 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 2), ctx);
38 }




43 for (r = k->rounds - 1; r > 0; r--) {
44 FOX_lmio64 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 2), ctx);
45 }








54 data[0] = input[0];





60 void FOX_lmor64 (uint32 *data,
61 const uint32 *key,
62 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
63 {
64 uint32 tmp[2], f;
65
66 tmp[0] = data[0];
67 tmp[1] = data[1];
68
69 f = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
70 FOX_f32 (&f, key, ctx);
71 tmp[0] ^= f;
72 tmp[1] ^= f;
73 FOX_or (tmp);
74
75 data[0] = tmp[0];
76 data[1] = tmp[1];
77 }
78
79 void FOX_lmid64 (uint32 *data,
80 const uint32 *key,
81 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
82 {
63
83 uint32 tmp[2], f;
84
85 tmp[0] = data[0];
86 tmp[1] = data[1];
87
88 f = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
89 FOX_f32 (&f, key, ctx);
90 tmp[0] ^= f;
91 tmp[1] ^= f;
92
93 data[0] = tmp[0];
94 data[1] = tmp[1];
95 }
96
97 void FOX_lmio64 (uint32 *data,
98 const uint32 *key,
99 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
100 {
101 uint32 tmp[2], f;
102
103 tmp[0] = data[0];
104 tmp[1] = data[1];
105
106 f = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
107 FOX_f32 (&f, key, ctx);
108 tmp[0] ^= f;
109 tmp[1] ^= f;
110 FOX_io (tmp);
111
112 data[0] = tmp[0];
113 data[1] = tmp[1];
114 }
115
116 void FOX_f32 (uint32 *data,
117 const uint32 *key,
118 const FOX64_ctx ctx)
119 {
120 uint32 i, o;
121
122 i = *data;
123
124 i ^= key[0];
125
126 o = ctx->sigma4_mu4_0->val[(i & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
127 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_1->val[(i & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
128 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_2->val[(i & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
129 o ^= ctx->sigma4_mu4_3->val[(i & 0x000000FF)];
130
131 o ^= key[1];
132
133 i = ctx->sigma4_0->val[(o & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
134 i ^= ctx->sigma4_1->val[(o & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
135 i ^= ctx->sigma4_2->val[(o & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
136 i ^= ctx->sigma4_3->val[(o & 0x000000FF)];
137




2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */











13 #define FOX128_MODE_ENCRYPT 0x0
14 #define FOX128_MODE_DECRYPT 0x1
15
16 #define FOX128_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN 12
17 #define FOX128_NUMBER_ROUNDS_GENERIC 16
18
19 #define FOX128_encrypt(p, k, ctx) FOX128_process((p), (k), (ctx), FOX128_MODE_ENCRYPT)
20 #define FOX128_decrypt(c, k, ctx) FOX128_process((c), (k), (ctx), FOX128_MODE_DECRYPT)
21
22 extern int FOX128_process (uint32 *, const FOX_key, const FOX128_ctx, const FOX_mode);
23
24 void FOX_elmor128 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
25 void FOX_elmid128 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
26 void FOX_elmio128 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
27
28 void FOX_f64 (uint32 *, const uint32 *, const FOX128_ctx);
29
30 #endif /* _FOX128_H_ */
File fox128.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */













16 int FOX128_process (uint32 *data,
17 const FOX_key k,
18 const FOX128_ctx ctx,





24 assert (data != NULL);
25 assert (k != NULL);
26 assert (ctx != NULL);
27
28 assert (k->rounds >= FOX128_NUMBER_ROUNDS_MIN);
29
30 input[0] = data[0];
31 input[1] = data[1];
32 input[2] = data[2];
33 input[3] = data[3];
34
35 switch (mode) {
36
37 case FOX128_MODE_ENCRYPT:
38 for (r = 0; r < k->rounds - 1; r++) {
39 FOX_elmor128 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 4), ctx);
40 }




45 for (r = k->rounds - 1; r > 0; r--) {
65
46 FOX_elmio128 (input, k->exp_key + (r * 4), ctx);
47 }








56 data[0] = input[0];
57 data[1] = input[1];
58 data[2] = input[2];





64 void FOX_elmor128 (uint32 *data,
65 const uint32 *key,
66 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
67 {
68 uint32 tmp[4], f[2];
69
70 tmp[0] = data[0];
71 tmp[1] = data[1];
72 tmp[2] = data[2];
73 tmp[3] = data[3];
74
75 f[0] = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
76 f[1] = tmp[2] ^ tmp[3];
77
78 FOX_f64 (f, key, ctx);
79
80 tmp[0] ^= f[0];
81 tmp[1] ^= f[0];
82 tmp[2] ^= f[1];
83 tmp[3] ^= f[1];
84
85 FOX_or (tmp);
86 FOX_or (tmp + 2);
87
88 data[0] = tmp[0];
89 data[1] = tmp[1];
90 data[2] = tmp[2];
91 data[3] = tmp[3];
92 }
93
94 void FOX_elmid128 (uint32 *data,
95 const uint32 *key,
96 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
97 {
98 uint32 tmp[4], f[2];
99
100 tmp[0] = data[0];
101 tmp[1] = data[1];
102 tmp[2] = data[2];
103 tmp[3] = data[3];
104
105 f[0] = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
106 f[1] = tmp[2] ^ tmp[3];
107
108 FOX_f64 (f, key, ctx);
109
110 tmp[0] ^= f[0];
111 tmp[1] ^= f[0];
112 tmp[2] ^= f[1];
113 tmp[3] ^= f[1];
114
115 data[0] = tmp[0];
66
116 data[1] = tmp[1];
117 data[2] = tmp[2];
118 data[3] = tmp[3];
119 }
120
121 void FOX_elmio128 (uint32 *data,
122 const uint32 *key,
123 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
124 {
125 uint32 tmp[4], f[2];
126
127 tmp[0] = data[0];
128 tmp[1] = data[1];
129 tmp[2] = data[2];
130 tmp[3] = data[3];
131
132 f[0] = tmp[0] ^ tmp[1];
133 f[1] = tmp[2] ^ tmp[3];
134
135 FOX_f64 (f, key, ctx);
136
137 tmp[0] ^= f[0];
138 tmp[1] ^= f[0];
139 tmp[2] ^= f[1];
140 tmp[3] ^= f[1];
141
142 FOX_io (tmp);
143 FOX_io (tmp + 2);
144
145 data[0] = tmp[0];
146 data[1] = tmp[1];
147 data[2] = tmp[2];
148 data[3] = tmp[3];
149 }
150
151 void FOX_f64 (uint32 *data,
152 const uint32 *key,
153 const FOX128_ctx ctx)
154 {
155 uint32 i[2], o[2];
156
157 i[0] = data[0];
158 i[1] = data[1];
159
160 i[0] ^= key[0];
161 i[1] ^= key[1];
162
163 o[0] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[(i[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
164 o[1] = ctx->sigma8_mu8_0->val[((i[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
165 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[(i[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
166 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_1->val[((i[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
167 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[(i[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
168 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_2->val[((i[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
169 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[(i[0] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
170 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_3->val[((i[0] & 0x000000FF) << 1)+ 1];
171
172 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[(i[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23];
173 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_4->val[((i[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 23) + 1];
174 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[(i[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15];
175 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_5->val[((i[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 15) + 1];
176 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[(i[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7];
177 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_6->val[((i[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 7) + 1];
178 o[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[(i[1] & 0x000000FF) << 1];
179 o[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_mu8_7->val[((i[1] & 0x000000FF) << 1) + 1];
180
181 o[0] ^= key[2];
182 o[1] ^= key[3];
183
184 i[0] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(o[0] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
185 i[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(o[0] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
67
186 i[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(o[0] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
187 i[0] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(o[0] & 0x000000FF)];
188
189 i[1] = ctx->sigma8_0->val[(o[1] & 0xFF000000) >> 24];
190 i[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_1->val[(o[1] & 0x00FF0000) >> 16];
191 i[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_2->val[(o[1] & 0x0000FF00) >> 8];
192 i[1] ^= ctx->sigma8_3->val[(o[1] & 0x000000FF)];
193
194 data[0] = i[0] ^ key[0];




2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */









12 int fox64_64_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
13 int fox64_128_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
14 int fox64_192_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
15 int fox64_256_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
16
17 int fox128_64_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
18 int fox128_128_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
19 int fox128_192_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
20 int fox128_256_16_test (const uint8 *p, const uint8 *k);
21
22 #endif /* _FOX_UTIL_H_ */
File fox util.c
1 /*****************************************************************************/
2 /* FOX project / Reference implementation v1.2 */















18 const uint8 p64[8] = {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67,
19 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF };
20
21 const uint8 p128[16] = {0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67,
22 0x89, 0xAB, 0xCD, 0xEF,
23 0xFE, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x98,
24 0x76, 0x54, 0x32, 0x10 };
25
26 const uint8 k[32] = {0x00, 0x11, 0x22, 0x33,
27 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77,
28 0x88, 0x99, 0xAA, 0xBB,
29 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF,
68
30 0xFF, 0xEE, 0xDD, 0xCC,
31 0xBB, 0xAA, 0x99, 0x88,
32 0x77, 0x66, 0x55, 0x44,
33 0x33, 0x22, 0x11, 0x00 };
34
35 int main ()
36 {
37 int return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
38
39 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX test vectors generator v1.2");
40 fprintf (stdout, "\n-------------------------------\n\n");
41
42 /* FOX64 test vectors */
43 if (fox64_64_16_test (p64, k)) {
44 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
45 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
46 goto error_label;
47 }
48 if (fox64_128_16_test (p64, k)) {
49 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
50 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
51 goto error_label;
52 }
53 if (fox64_192_16_test (p64, k)) {
54 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
55 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
56 goto error_label;
57 }
58 if (fox64_256_16_test (p64, k)) {
59 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");




64 /* FOX128 test vectors */
65 if (fox128_64_16_test (p128, k)) {
66 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
67 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
68 goto error_label;
69 }
70 if (fox128_128_16_test (p128, k)) {
71 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
72 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
73 goto error_label;
74 }
75 if (fox128_192_16_test (p128, k)) {
76 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
77 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
78 goto error_label;
79 }
80 if (fox128_256_16_test (p128, k)) {
81 fprintf (stdout, "\nFatal error_exiting!\n");
















98 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
99
69
100 if (FOX64_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
101 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
102 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
103 goto error_label;
104 }
105 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX64/16/64 key : ");
106 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
107 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
108 }
109 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/64 message : ");
110 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
111 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
112 }
113 if (FOX64_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 64, 16)) {
114 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
115 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
116 goto error_label;
117 }
118 memcpy (c, p, 8);
119 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
120 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
121 FOX64_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
122 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/64 ciphertext : ");
123 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
124 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
125 }
126 FOX64_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
127 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/64 message : ");
128 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
129 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
130 }















146 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
147
148 if (FOX64_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
149 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
150 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
151 goto error_label;
152 }
153 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX64/16/128 key : ");
154 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
155 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
156 }
157 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/128 message : ");
158 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
159 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
160 }
161 if (FOX64_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 128, 16)) {
162 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
163 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
164 goto error_label;
165 }
166 memcpy (c, p, 8);
167 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
168 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
169 FOX64_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
70
170 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/128 ciphertext : ");
171 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
172 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
173 }
174 FOX64_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
175 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/128 message : ");
176 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
177 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
178 }















194 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
195
196 if (FOX64_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
197 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
198 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
199 goto error_label;
200 }
201 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX64/16/192 key : ");
202 for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
203 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
204 }
205 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/192 message : ");
206 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
207 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
208 }
209 if (FOX64_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 192, 16)) {
210 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
211 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
212 goto error_label;
213 }
214 memcpy (c, p, 8);
215 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
216 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
217 FOX64_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
218 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/192 ciphertext : ");
219 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
220 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
221 }
222 FOX64_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
223 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/192 message : ");
224 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
225 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
226 }















241 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
242
243 if (FOX64_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
244 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
245 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
246 goto error_label;
247 }
248 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX64/16/256 key : ");
249 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
250 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
251 }
252 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/256 message : ");
253 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
254 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
255 }
256 if (FOX64_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 256, 16)) {
257 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
258 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
259 goto error_label;
260 }
261 memcpy (c, p, 8);
262 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
263 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
264 FOX64_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
265 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/256 ciphertext : ");
266 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
267 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
268 }
269 FOX64_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
270 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX64/16/256 message : ");
271 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
272 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
273 }















289 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
290
291 if (FOX128_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
292 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
293 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
294 goto error_label;
295 }
296 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX128/16/64 key : ");
297 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
298 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
299 }
300 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/64 message : ");
301 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
302 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
303 }
304 if (FOX128_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 64, 16)) {
305 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
306 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
307 goto error_label;
308 }
309 memcpy (c, p, 16);
72
310 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
311 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
312 c32[2] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 8);
313 c32[3] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 12);
314 FOX128_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
315 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/64 ciphertext : ");
316 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
317 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
318 }
319 FOX128_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
320 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/64 message : ");
321 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
322 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
323 }















339 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
340
341 if (FOX128_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
342 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
343 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
344 goto error_label;
345 }
346 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX128/16/128 key : ");
347 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
348 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
349 }
350 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/128 message : ");
351 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
352 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
353 }
354 if (FOX128_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 128, 16)) {
355 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
356 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
357 goto error_label;
358 }
359 memcpy (c, p, 16);
360 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
361 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
362 c32[2] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 8);
363 c32[3] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 12);
364 FOX128_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
365 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/128 ciphertext : ");
366 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
367 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
368 }
369 FOX128_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
370 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/128 message : ");
371 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
372 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
373 }
















389 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
390
391 if (FOX128_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
392 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
393 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
394 goto error_label;
395 }
396 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX128/16/192 key : ");
397 for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
398 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
399 }
400 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/192 message : ");
401 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
402 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
403 }
404 if (FOX128_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 192, 16)) {
405 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
406 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
407 goto error_label;
408 }
409 memcpy (c, p, 16);
410 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
411 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
412 c32[2] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 8);
413 c32[3] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 12);
414 FOX128_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
415 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/192 ciphertext : ");
416 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
417 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
418 }
419 FOX128_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
420 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/192 message : ");
421 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
422 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
423 }















439 int i, return_value = EXIT_SUCCESS;
440
441 if (FOX128_init_ctx (&ctx)) {
442 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
443 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
444 goto error_label;
445 }
446 fprintf (stdout, "\n\nFOX128/16/256 key : ");
447 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
448 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (k + 4*i));
449 }
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450 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/256 message : ");
451 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
452 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", U8TO32_BIG (p + 4*i));
453 }
454 if (FOX128_init_key (&key, ctx, k, 256, 16)) {
455 fprintf (stderr, "\nFatal error...exiting!\n");
456 return_value = EXIT_FAILURE;
457 goto error_label;
458 }
459 memcpy (c, p, 16);
460 c32[0] = U8TO32_BIG (c);
461 c32[1] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 4);
462 c32[2] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 8);
463 c32[3] = U8TO32_BIG (c + 12);
464 FOX128_encrypt (c32, key, ctx);
465 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/256 ciphertext : ");
466 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
467 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
468 }
469 FOX128_decrypt (c32, key, ctx);
470 fprintf (stdout, "\nFOX128/16/256 message : ");
471 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
472 fprintf (stdout, "%08X ", c32[i]);
473 }
474 fprintf (stdout, "\n\n");
475
476 error_label:
477 FOX128_clean_ctx (ctx);
478 FOX128_clean_key (key);
479
480 return return_value;
481 }
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